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Abstract
In the following thesis, titled "'Wheel within Wheel': The Mystics of William Blake," I
discuss William Blake's writing with respect to the debate over whether Blake's poetry and
prose is most aptly described as predominantly engaging in the mystical or the visionary. I
dispute the interpretation that Blake's works are visionary in opposition to the mystical. Instead,
I claim that the visionary analysis of Blake's writing is founded on an exclusionary
understanding of the mystical. Moreover, if we take into account the various explications of the
mystical and the visionary, then we see that Blake's poetry and prose exhibits characteristics of
both the mystical and the visionary . Thus, it is necessary to give an overview of Blake criticism
stretching back nearly a century. In doing so, we observe how the critical debate developed over
whether Blake is pursuing the mystical or the visionary. Furthermore, it becomes evident that
this debate centers on a singular understanding of these terms. An exposition of other
interpretations of the mystical and the visionary demonstrates that Blake's works cannot be
labeled as either mystical or visionary. Finally, I briefly discuss Blake's final epic,Jerusalem, to
illustrate how Blake's writing displays charac1eristics of both the mystical and the visionary. The
conclusion leaves room for further study and research in terms of reading Blake's works with an
eye for both the mystical and the visionary and therefore not focusing on one to the exclusion of
the other.
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"Wheel within Wheel ":
The Mystics' of William Blake
"Translation ... always has to ignore many aspects of the poet' s
original achievement. " (Frye, Fearful Symmetry 419)
"I must Create a System, orbeenslav'd by another Mans
I will not Reason and Compare; my busine ss is to Create .l"
(Blake , Jerusalem 10.20-21)
"The sayable continues to be wounded by the unsayable ."
(de Certeau , Mystic Fable 78)
This thesis primarily engages the enigmatic works of William Blake on the grounds of a
mystical affiliation that has long been a source of rigorous debate . I posit an understanding of
Blake 's illuminated works that is complementary with contemporary interpretive models while
simultaneously engaging in a comparative analysis with earlier Blake criticism. The question of
whether mysticism is found in Blake 's works is the primar y concern in terms of an identifiable
critical friction for labeling Blake as a visionary poet or as a mystic poet ; particularly as
exemplified in the highly influential and insightful critical work of renowned literary scholar,
Northrop Frye , author of Fearful Symmetry , a pillar in the heritage of Blakean interpretation. I
use Frye as indicative of the mid-twentieth-century critical trend that tends toward an archetypal
reading of Blake 's verse and prose ; a trend that describes Blake 's prolific canon as visionary,
with the seemingly crucial qualification that vision is not to be confused with the mystical. In the
following discussion, I discuss the terms vision and mystical with respect to the multiplicity of
possibilities and descriptions that are found in a wide range of academic work.
Recent Blake critics such as Dan Miller note a general critical trend (that applies to
readings of Blake's works) whereby literary scholars use a predetermined set of expectations,
deriving conclusions from these expectations and not the work itself (Miller 147). Northrop
Frye's reading of Blake's works is exemplary in illustrating how one's critical impetus can
directly influence the conclusions derived from a specific reading of a work of literature.
However, Frye's archetypal analysis of Blake's works cannot be simply and generally described.
In the present discussion, I assert it is Frye's description of mysticism that directly influences his
reading of Blake's writing, a description offered within the opening pages of Fearful Symmetry.
This is not to say that archetypal analysis is therefore a useless interpretive device in reading
Blake's poetry, but to acknowledge the developing contemporary readings of Blake's poetry and
prose while offering an alternative depiction of the critical debate over vision and mysticism.
With this problem in mind, the aim of the thesis is twofold: 1) to expound an analysis of
Blake's works using French scholar Michel de Certeau's notion of mystics and thus, 2) to address
the debate over whether Blake's works are mystical or visionary. I maintain that Blake's works
do not neatly fit the interpretive mold that they have been given, especially with respect to the
mysticism that Blake is apparently not engaged in, as Frye declares in his reading of Blake's
works, a reading which yields an exclusionary demarcation of mysticism. According to Frye,
mysticism is not complementary with Blake's ideas of divinity. In other words, since Blake is a
visionary writer, then he is not engaged in mysticism, and Frye attempts to separate the two as
distinct fields. However, as stated throughout this discussion, Frye's argument exemplifies the
critical trend of predetermining one's reading ofliterary works before reading or discussing
those very same works. The present discussion is not an attack on Frye's intellectual
achievements in Blake studies, but part of a larger point with respect to terminology, illustrated
through the discussion of vision and mysticism. In this way, Frye predetermines that Blake is a
visionary poet and not a mystic writer. I avoid this problem (if it can be avoided at all) by
maintaining that although I presently discuss Blake's works in terms of mystics, I do not
simultaneously exclude the possibility of reading his poetry and prose as visionary.
Blake's final epic piece, Jerusalem : The Emanation ofthe Giant Albion, serves as an apt
focal point in the present discussion of mystics. However, as Frye asserts in the above opening
quotation: 'Translation.. .always has to ignore many aspects of the poet's original achievement."
Thus, immediately the danger inherent in this statement arises, that the present discussion
excludes emphasis on most of Blake's works, and to a larger extent ignores a multitude of
possible readings. On the other hand, Frye's reading of Jerusalem attempts to interpret Blake's
prose and verse as deriving from one single archetype with minor variations, that archetype
being the Bible. In this way, Frye seems to incorporate all of Blake's works into the one
archetypal narrative, thus rendering a more generalized reading that ignores certain details in
favor of, as Miller notes, a "purely literary idealism" (155). Thus, in my reading of Jerusalem,
the focus is on Blake's verse, not on an archetype that supposedly holds the poem together,
except, perhaps, where Blake directly addresses such issues in his own words.
The first chapter discusses a number of critical perspectives on Blake to yield a sense of
the variety of interpretive angles, especially in current studies in the past twenty years.
Consequently, it is evident that recent Blake studies, while respecting the advances of critical
trends developed in the early to mid twentieth century, push beyond the borders of these
readings. The second chapter is an intensive analysis of the terms mystic / mysticism, vision /
visionary, and mystics from a number of different scholars, including but not limited to Jewish
scholar Gershom Scholem, Blake critic Sheila A. Spector, Michel de Certeau, and Northrop
Frye. The various definitions of mysticism and vision yield an impression of the intricate nature
of these elusive concepts, concepts that therefore cannot be simplified into one perspective or
disposition. Chapter three is a reading of significant passages from Blake's Jerusalem grounded
on the developments and conclusions from chapter two. The conclusion gives a brief discussion
of the implications of the previous analyses of Jerusalem for future studies of Blake's works.
Chapter 1: The Heritage of Blake Studies
"To Generalize is to be an Idiot. To Particularize is the
Alone Distinction of Merit. General Knowledges are
those Knowledgesthat Idiotspcssess."
(Blake, Annotations to The W'Jrks of Sir Joshua Reynolds 641)
The aim of outlining various critical angles on Blake's works is to demonstrate the
importance of the debate over vision and mysticism in addition to illustrating the number and
diversity of these interpretations and the consequent impossibility ofa comprehensive reading of
Blake's works. The counter argument is that there must be a definitive approach to Blake's
works, that literary criticism demands such a reading. However, as recent readings of Blake's
canon show, appeals to purely literary interpretive models result in self-contradictions and
necessary omissions. I use de Certeau's mystics to develop a particular reading of Jerusalem that
does not make exclusionary generalizations about mysticism with respect to Blake's works. I
begin with a summary of early Blake criticism that centers on the debate regarding Blake's
mysticism.
One of the earliest and most influential critics of Blake's prose and poetry, S. Foster
Damon, offers a reading completely in terms of mysticism. In William Blake, published in 1924,
he asserts, "The key to everything Blake ever wrote or painted lies in his mysticism" (l). Damon
takes a specific notion of mysticism, which he derives from the work of Evelyn Underhill, and
utilizes this concept of mysticism to yield insight into Blake's intentions as a poet and painter,
"his mysticism," which Damon then uses to describe the whole of Blake's works. Three years
later, Helen C. White published a similar study that focuses on mysticism and compares the
categories mystic, prophet, or visionary. White differs from Damon by being critical of Blake's
mysticism, concluding: "he is not a great mystic in any sense that means anything" (White 245).
Instead of responding to these and other studies of Blake's works, Frye commits little space and
energy to an interpretation of Blake's works as mystical; instead, Frye focuses on a visionary
orientation, set in opposition to a mystical reading.
In his study of Blake's verse and prose, Fearful Symmetry, published in 1947, Frye
asserts that "Blake's poems are poems, and must be studied as such. Any attempt to explain them
in terms of something that is not poetry is-bound to fail" (6). The aim of Frye's analysis is
therefore to clearly delineate the parameters of this assimilation into the canon in terms of
Blake's works being "not aboriginal. .. neither a freak nor a sport" (5). In addition, Frye insists
that Blake's works require strictly literary interpretation as opposed to "deciphering: there can be
no 'key' and no open-sesame formula and no patented system of translation" (7). However,
Frye's archetypal analysis of Blake's works itself posits an "open-sesame formula" grounded on
one "central myth, that myth being the Bible" (109). On the other hand, it is difficult to cover
every detail of any work of art without omitting or overlooking other aspects, as Frye goes on to
admit that "many aspects of the poet's original achievement" may be ignored.
On the one hand, Frye claims that Blake's writing cannot be read through a singular
"patented system of translation," yet on then other Frye describes the interpretation of Blake's
Jerusalem as grounded on two qualifications: "[ I] how Blake interpreted the Bible, and [2] how
he placed that interpretation in an English context" (356). Frye appeals to the subconscious and
to the "Romantic tradition" for furnishing an archetypal pattern, one that fits the "analogue" of
the Biblical pattern that is found to be expressed in Blake's works:
A study of comparative religion, a morphology of myths, rituals and theologies,
[which] will lead us to a single visionary conception which the mind ... is trying to
express, a vision of a created and fallen world which has been redeemed by a
divine sacrifice and is proceeding to regeneration. (424; italics mine)
Frye appeals to early twentieth-century theoretical models for being foreshadowed in the ideas
found in Blake's works: "Twentieth century culture has produced a large number of theories
which seem to demand some kind of fitting together, and we have found a good many of them in
Blake" (425). The result of such an analysis is tantamount to declaring that no matter what
subject area one engages in, all the results, the labor, of scientists and artists alike, are to be
pieces, mirror images of the one all-reflecting archetype, the one pattern of which everything is a
part to whole. Blake's Albion, the mythical figuration of the British Isles itself, whose "body"
incorporates the characters, actions, setting and dialogue, can be interpreted through an
archetypal analysis that posits a "fitting together" into a "single visionary conception." In other
words, Frye's archetypal analysis allows a reading that glosses over the many particularities and
inconsistencies of Blake's epic poems. Consequently, Frye's analysis is a milestone in Blake
criticism, as his archetypal reading continues to be highly influential in current discussions of
Blake's verse.
Two contemporaries of Frye, David V. Erdman and Harold Bloom, offer interpretations
of Blake's poetry and prose that are posterior to Frye's Fearful Symmetry, and are thus deeply
influenced by Frye's archetypal reading. For example, in Blake's Apocalypse, published in 1963,
Bloom claims: "To Mr. Frye's work I have a... pervasive obligation, for by reading him I learned
to read Blake" (x). Bloom's analysis yields an expanded and rigorously close reading of Blake's
verse, thereby engaging in a discussion that complements Frye's archetypal analysis. Bloom
discusses Blake's Jerusalem in accord with Frye's analysis in maintaining that Blake's last epic
piece is constructed from the Biblical archetype of a fallen world seeking redemption. For
Bloom, Blake specifically follows the tradition of the prophets Isaiah and Ezekiel: "Like Isaiah
and Ezekiel, Blake believed he had the decisive power of the eternal moment of human choice as
a direct gift and trust from the Divine, and he seems to have imitated the organization of their
books even as he believed his election as prophet was in direct succession to their own" (405).
Bloom places Blake's works within the prophetic tradition, particularly as exemplified in English
literature by the epic poems of John Milton, one of Blake's personally acknowledged influences,
although the degree of criticism Blake engaged in is here overlooked, particularly with respect to
Blake's comment: "Imitation is Criticism" (Annotations to The Works ofSir Joshua Reynolds
643). In other words, Bloom does not pay enough attention to the political implications of
Blake's art, instead glossing over Blake's imitation and criticism of the English heritage in favor
of pursuing an archetypal, visionary reading.
In Blake: Prophet Against Empire, published in 1954, Erdman takes a different critical
route by focusing on the biographical and historical influences that shape Blake's prose and
poetry. In place of Frye and Bloom's literary and Biblical emphasis, Erdman discusses the
historical context in which Blake wrote: "William Blake lived through sixty-nine years of wars
and revolutions, political, historical, and intellectual" (3). Erdman reads Jerusalem specifically in
terms of an historical, political and biographical construction:
The contemporary frame of reference is the latter part of the war [the Napoleonic
War], the years of Napoleon's decline and fall and of the triumph of British and
German arms, when the problem is not simply to dissuade Albion from fighting
but to oppose his making a conqueror's peace. Hence the motif of Jerusalem is
peace without vengeance. (462)
In a critical correspondence to Frye and Bloom's discussions, Erdman asserts that the conclusion
of Jerusalem "is simple but effective ... a hymn to the spiritual regeneration of man and nature"
(484). Thus, in the criticisms advanced by Frye, Erdman and Bloom we can identify similar
discussions of the disorder found throughout Jerusalem. Moreover, from this comparison we see
the subsequent focus on the order that is achieved in the concluding section of Blake's last epic
work, thereby focusing on "fitting together" Blake's design in Jerusalem and therefore in the
whole of Blake's works.
However, throughout the present discussion of mystics and Jerusalem, the question
remains whether this "fitting together" is actually to be found in Blake's verse and prose, or
whether it is a critical model that is forced upon the interpretation. For example, a similar
problem is extensively discussed with respect to literary studies of Franz Kafka's prose. In
Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari discuss how archetypal
analyses operate: "the archetype works by assimilation, homogenization, and thematics" (7). For
Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka's writing is consistently construed as ordered by certain principles
and themes, "the transcendence of the law, the interiority of guilt, the subjectivity of
enunciation," which 1) gives a reading of Kafka's works based on certain themes and therefore,
2) ignores and excludes those components of Kafka's writing that do not fit these principle
motifs (45). However, what Deleuze and Guattari mean is that having reached a critical
consensus on Kafka's writing it is now time to read Kafka's work from a different perspective. A
similar critical consensus has developed with respect to Blake's writing in terms of the debate
over whether Blake ought to be defined as a visionary or a mystic. Another significant point of
interest is Deleuze and Guattari's designation of literary criticism as "territorialization" such that
if Kafka's prose is perceived as a territory, than the criticism of his works is an invasion of that
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territory. Deleuze and Guattari assert that their analysis is a "deterritorialization," a process of
interpretation that peels the critical discursive layers back to reveal the nature of this criticism,
although this is far from simplifying the literary work or rendering it into one archetypal pattern.
For, as Deleuze and Guattari state, the author's intent with respect to artistic labor is itself a
territorialization that sets and maintains its own parameters. Hence, the significant focus for
interpretation shifts to those points which ·rupture the author's own intent and design, those
ambiguous sites that cannot be contained, that consequently dismantle from within the intended
order of the work itself.
The aim of noting Deleuze and Guattari's work on Kafka's writing is to demonstrate the
shift in literary theory from archetypal, generalizing analyses to more radical interpretations that
lay no pretense to a general understanding of Blake's artistic direction or success in achieving
this direction, as is currently ongoing and developing in contemporary readings of Blake's works
such as that offered in Dan Miller's discussion. The following outline of recent Blake criticism
serves to illustrate the similar paradigm shift in literary studies of Blake's works, a shift that
focuses on an internal reading of Blake's verse that acknowledges inconsistency instead of
developing a precise order that is forced upon Blake's works, as is the case in archetypal
analysis. Blake's artistic goal is precise, meaning that Blake strictly adhered to ideas that did not
allow for ambiguity, since Blake perceived in ambiguity the possibility, manifested all around
him, of taking ambiguous material, such as the Bible, and using the multitudinous nature of
scripture to manipulate individuals and societies. However, Blake's verse and prose display an
inner tension of disorder and chaos, a motif discussed with respect to Blake's works for over a
century. However, recent studies concentrate on those aspects that are ignored for the sake of
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argument, various parts of Blake's writing that contradict the archetypal nature of Blake's
prophetic epics that Frye, Erdman and Bloom claim are visionary.
At present, the range of Blake criticism has proliferated beyond the field of literary
theory to interdisciplinary studies that consider elements of Blake's poetry that are not thematic
on any generalizing or archetypal pattern. In "'Self-Annihilation' and Dialogue in Blake's
Creative Process: Urizen, Milton. Jerusalem," published in 1994, John H. Jones discusses
Blake's major prophetic epics in terms of Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogism, a literary theory that
focuses interpretation on the nature of dialogue and discursive interaction. Jones discusses
Blake's works in terms of the multiple voices that make up an entangled interactive web of
multiple relationships and communications:
Since no utterance can be isolated completely from this dialogic matrix [i.e of
multiple interactive discursive relationships between characters], each utterance,
as a response, has its source in the discourse of others. These references in
Blake's writings to other figures, in statements and in addressees, indicate a
profound realization of the dialogic nature of discourse. (3)
Jones reads Jerusalem as a network of different dialogues that reciprocally influence each other
in a complex narrative, as opposed to a thematic archetype that is based on the Biblical paradigm
of a fallen world. Of course, Blake's verse is concerned with the fallen state of a post-Edenic
world, and part of his solution is undoubtedly intended to be a clarity of vision, the precise
hammering of Los' artistic forge.
Other interdisciplinary readings use political theories to interpret Blake's works with
respect to the possibility of discovering a political agenda. For example, Vincent O'Keefe
discusses Blake's final prophetic epic in "Debunking the Romantic Ideology: A Review of
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Blake's Jerusalem." published in 1996. O'Keefe claims that despite the historical chronology ,
Blake's works do not conveniently fit the Romantic period. In contrast, O'Keefe argues that
Blake's Jerusalem "is more akin to new historicism [Marxism] than to any romantic ideology"
(40). O'Keefe's discussion is concerned with interpreting a specific political motif, in this case
Marxism, in Blake's writing. This political motifis comparatively discussed with respect to
Blake's ideas in terms of Blake's social concerns about the class struggle between those in
positions of power and wealth and those individuals who are weaker and poorer.
Steven Goldsmith's "Blake's Agitation," also published in 1996, offers a reading of
Blake's poetry and prose similar to both Jones' and O'Keefe's interpretations. Goldsmith
discusses Jerusalem through the idea of agitation, which he maintains is a crucial notion for
reading Blake's works in general. He cites multiple meanings of the word "agitation," ranging
from the purely physical notion to a philosophical understanding that describes agitation as
public friction. Moreover, Goldsmith asserts that Blake's poetry itself agitates, and that Los,
Blake's predominant protagonist throughout his major epics, is the main agitator: "Los is Blake's
arsonist-agent.. .[who fights] on behalf of'Minute Particulars' against the'Generalizing God s'"
(761). Goldsmith's reading complements Jones' dialogic discussion, particularly in his claim that
the "mind's monologue is always already dialogic" (780). Goldsmith and Jones both yield a
reading of Blake's poetry that is not singular or archetypal but is a testimony to a multiply-
voiced, reciprocally influential interactive world that is mirrored in Blake's works.
Other readings of Blake's works are more conventional, whether structurally or
thematically based. Robert F. Gleckner, in "Blake's 'Dark Visions of Torment' Unfolded:
Innocence to Jerusalem," published in 1996, discusses the poetic affiliation between Blake's
verse and John Milton's influential works. Of course, with an epic poem titled Milton: A Poem,
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Blake directly invites readings in terms of Milton's poetry, a theme that Frye and Bloom discuss
and that Gleckner engages in his reading of the entirety of Blake's illuminated works. In
addition, Gleckner insists that Blake's poetry is an attempt toward dispelling Blake's own inner
irritation and consequent solution for the fallen state of the world. Another conventional analysis
is found in W. H. Stevenson's "Blake's Progress," published in 1999. Just as Gleckner notes that
Blake's poetry could not move beyond the fallen state it attempts to liberate, Stevenson
illustrates a similar phenomenon with respect to Blake's intent as a revolutionary poet in
revolutionary times: "The legend that Blake first devised has proved invalid, leaving him no
choice but to devise a new myth to replace it" (204). For Stevenson, the tenor of Blake's voice
changes throughout the chronology of his poems from the disposition of a spiritual "warrior" to
an evangelical "healer" (202-203). Both Gleckner and Stevenson survey the entirety of Blake's
works. Gleckner concludes that Jerusalem, despite the overcoming of the fallen world through
apocalypse, nevertheless focuses on apocalypse and somehow therefore never escapes that focus,
whereas Stevenson asserts that Jerusalem is the concluding and most elaborate step in the
direction of Blake's ultimately reconciliatory temperament in opposition to his initial poetic
demeanor of revolutionary energy.
From another critical perspective, R. Paul Yoder discusses Jerusalem in terms of a copy-
text issue in "What Happens When: Narrative and the Changing Sequencing of Plates in Blake's
Jerusalem," published in 2002. There are five different copies of Jerusalem labeled A, C, D, E
and F such that A, C, F and D, E constitute two different versions of the epic poem, differing on
the plate sequencing of chapter two. The ongoing debate centers on which version Blake
intended as the most favorable or authoritative copy text. Yoder argues that, contrary to the
predominant interpretation of Blake's changing the sequence, Blake changed the plates based on
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narrative considerations. Many readings of Blake's works are often synchronic and non-linear,
although Yoder maintains that Jerusalem is a diachronic, chronologically based narrative poem.
In contrast to Yoder, Stevenson and Gleckner, other analyses of Blake's works are
interdisciplinary studies, such as Wai Chee Dimock's "Nonbiological Clock: Literary History
Against Newtonian Mechanics," published in 2003. Dimock posits an interesting comparative
analysis, which argues that the radical break in Albert Einstein's physics from those of Isaac
Newton is analogous to the significance of Blake's works with respect to the history of literature
itself. Dimock asserts Newton is targeted in Blake's poems for the static rigidity described in
Newtonian mechanics, especially with respect to linear, chronological time. Moreover, Dimock
suggests that Newton's physics represent for Blake the death of the imagination through
numerical incarceration and what Dimock labels the "law of serialization" (167). Dimock
concludes that Blake's poems seek to disentangle Newtonian time by exploding it through his
epic verse and that in much the same way Blake's verse explodes the tradition ofliterature itself:
Literary history ... is not sequential, not governed by the law of serialization.
Those who dwell in it are free to take what they want, in whatever order, for the
raw material here - as Blake's steadily cascading sentences make clear- is
nothing more than words, a lexis not sequenced, as malleable as clay, and as
commonly available. (167)
Dimock implies that Blake's poems, by taking as a main crisis the acceptance of Newtonian
physics, also criticize the mechanical age taking hold in Blake 's time and illustrated all
throughout Blake's writing. For example, Newtonian time, universal in its demand to make
everything understood in terms of chronological order, thus permeates every field, including that
of literature and literary history . However, Dimock maintains that Blake's poems signal a direct
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rejection of this linear model: "literary history is ... both a shelter from serial numbers and a sharp
reminder of their dominion" (168-169).
In another interdisciplinary study, under the general title "Mysticism and Misogyny:
Contraries and their Mystical /Metaphysical Background in the Works of William Blake," three
different critics, Josephine A. McQuail, Pamela Beal and Rachel V. Billigheimer, apply feminist
theories of misogyny to determine whether or not Blake's works are overtly misogynist or
forcibly made to be in a campaign to root out misogynist poets, published in 2000. In "Trembling
Before the Eternal Female: Blake's Call to a Transcendental Eros," Beal gives an analysis of
Blake's "Female Will" and "Eternal Female," a discussion that does not stipulate Blake's poetry
and prose as misogynist. Beal argues that the Female subject plays a crucial role in Blake's epic
verse, specifically in the construction of the general human subject, both physically and
psychically: "Blake refutes the idea that such attributes as good or evil belong to the subject and
insists that intellect alone, the capacity for subjective judgment, constitutes the self. The subject
is not the aggregate of its experiences but the capacity to organize experience, to give shape to
experience" (83-84). Beal's comments here draw to mind Blake's often quoted declaration: "I
must Create a System, or be enslav'd by another Mans / I will not Reason & Compare: my
business is to Create" (Jerusalem 10.21-22). One of Blake's central ideas is political in terms of
an individual's independence from manipulation through various religious, economic and
political institutions , much in the same way Dimock describes Blake's break with prevalent
Newtonian mechanics in order to disrupt a system that homogenizes perception and experience
as chronologically fixed in an inescapable succession of time and duration. However, according
to Beal the subject is not to be understood this way in Blake's poems, but rather as organizing its
own time, not as a homogenous "aggregate" of "experiences," but instead in terms of the
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subject's capacity, through the imagination, to organize experiences, to "Create a System, or be
enslav'd by another."
In "Conflict and Conquest: Creation, Emanation and the Female Will in William Blake's
Mythology," Billigheimer discusses the Female Will and emanation in Blake's poems in terms of
the dichotomous nature of the Female that fluctuates between passive and aggressive
representations. In addition, Billigheimer asserts that, in labeling Blake's poems as misogynistic,
many critics overlook the importance the Female plays in the apocalypse and return of divinity,
the way in which "the ultimate union of the female Emanation with her male counterpart
precipitates the vision of eternity" (94). Moreover, Billigheimer states that female characters
display as much cunning and power as male characters in Blake's works: "Blake ... demonstrates
there isjust as much discord ... between women as there is between men and women and this is
rooted in the divisions within the individual's psyche. The Female Will can be seen as a
metaphor for the urge to power and domination possessed by humanity in general" (l08).
Billigheimer focuses on both dimensions of women in Blake's poetry and prose instead of
concentrating on a strictly negative or supposedly misogynistic representation of women.
The final article in the series on feminist issues in Blake's verse, Josephine A. McQuail's
"Passion and Mysticism in William Blake," discusses a misreading of misogyny in Blake's
works owing to a misapprehension of the mysticism found in his poetry and prose. McQuail's
central aim is to question a feminist psychoanalytic analysis of Blake's works in response to the
stereotypical feminist reading that asserts Blake's poetry is misogynistic. McQuail addresses the
general question of whether Blake's verse is best described as misogynistic or as mystical,
concluding that what is construed in Blake's poems as misogynistic is in actuality a mysticism
and prophetic vision: "psychoanalysis cannot explain prophecy except to say it is a neurosis"
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(131). Furthermore, McQuail uses Michel de Certeau' s description of mystics to explain the
element of mysticism in Blake's poetry and prose.' Beal, Billigheimer and McQuail all discuss
Blake's works in defense of his use of women against what each describes as stereotypically
dismissive feminist criticism.
Other recent criticism of Blake's works offer readings that are largely at odds with
predominant mid-twentieth-century, archetypal interpretations, as demonstrated in the
contemporary writings of Dan Miller, Hazard Adams, Paul Youngquist, Molly Anne Rothenberg
and Dominic Rainsford. In "Blake and the Deconstructive Interlude," published in 1987, Miller
claims that Blake's works are up for reevaluation in terms of the archetypal interpretation that
has settled as a given mode of understanding Blake's poems and ideas. Miller describes Blake's
poetry as occupying "a secure and even central place in the [literary] tradition: he is a name to be
invoked, a figure by which to define English Romanticism and, after Northrop Frye, the totality
of literature" (139). As described above, Miller is critical of archetypal interpretation for
predetermining readings of Blake's works and thereby ignoring those aspects of the poems that
contradict the predetermined reading (147). Moreover, Miller asserts that mid-twentieth-century
readings conform to a thematic idealism that eradicates narrative and structural inconsistencies
like Frye and Bloom's insistence that Blake's works perfectly fit the English literary canon in
terms of a Biblical archetypal pattern. These readings therefore overlook other issues such as the
above interdisciplinary articles regarding copy text issues, feminist concerns or the relation
between Blake's poems and the shift from Newton's universal physics to Einstein's relativity
(155). Of course, Frye and Bloom would not have been able to foresee the future of literary
theory, and Miller contrasts their theory only to draw attention to a different critical approach to
Blake's writing.
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Ironically, Miller posits that, contrary to both Blake and his critics, the concept of
allegory is a fitting description for those aspects of Blake's poems that resist and disrupt
archetypal readings: "[allegory] marks the place of all that vision seeks to transcend but cannot
leave behind - the inevitability [or inescapability] of some mode of representation within all
perception, the figural component of the imagination" (162). Miller interprets Blake's works as
attempting to give a vision of divinity that is a pure and elevated perception, reconciled with the
fallen state of the world found in Blake's epic poems, but is inevitably presented through the
medium oflanguage, a descriptive device in the production of this elevated perception. In
simplest terms, Miller asserts that if Blake seeks to reject allegory on the grounds of its
ambiguous and dangerous nature, then Blake's writing fails immediately since all language, even
that which describes visions of eternity, is prey to the same ambiguous and dangerous nature of
allegory that Blake strongly criticizes.
In "Jerusalem's Didactic and Mimetic-Narrative Experiment," published in 1993, Hazard
Adams has a similar agenda in explicitly claiming not to offer a reading that predetermines the
interpretation of Blake's works and gives a more rigorous discussion of Blake's verse, whereas
Miller's analysis is more focused on theoretical concerns . Adams describes Jerusalem as a
"proliferation" of actions, spaces and utterances that cannot be isolated into one "monomyth"
constructed out of one archetypal pattern (629). Adams challenges given assumptions with
respect to Blake's unique poetic mythology and Jerusalem. For example, Adams discusses
Blake's emanations, which are personalities that separate from predominant characters,
particularly in the fallen state of the world (thus, the character after which the epic is named,
Jerusalem, is the emanation of Albion). In general, emanations represent the feminine aspect of a
whole person in the unfallen, Edenic world of divinity . Adams locates one point in Jerusalem
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where the assumption that emanations are feminine is disputed (or disrupted), and the character
Shiloh is described as a masculine emanation (645). For Adams, the critical consensus with
respect to Jerusalem has become reified and overlooks, whether intentionally or not, the dynamic
of the epic poem that resists archetypal interpretations.
Paul Youngquist, in "Reading the Apocalypse: The Narrativity of Blake's Jerusalem,"
also published in 1993, discusses a similar problematic with respect to a reified interpretive
model of Blake's works. As with Miller, Youngquist gives a more generalized analysis tbat does
not pay as close attention to Blake's verse as Adams does, although all three write in response to
earlier archetypal analyses. Youngquist makes a claim parallel to Miller's with respect to
Jerusalem in terms of thematic and archetypal readings :
It was not until critics began to recover stable patterns beneath the shifting surface
of Blake's poem that it acquired the life of canonical literature. In a move I would
call formalist, Jerusalem was rendered coherent, or at least partially so, tprough
an appeal to formal or thematic structures that silently organize its disorderly
narrative. (602)
Furthermore, Youngquist cites Frye's Fearful Symmetry as initiating an archetypal analysis of
Blake's works "on a grand scale" in terms of a "permanent structure" or archetypal pattern,
particularly based on the Bible (603). However, as with Miller and Adams, Youngquist asserts
that such readings, though allowing for some readable interpretation of Jerusalem, which is
frequently depicted as a chaotic and confusing epic poem, still overlook and even subordinate
those interpretive angles that are problematic for maintaining an archetypal perspective (604).
For example, Youngquist claims that Blake's use of proper names is an embarrassing
characteristic that causes friction within archetypal readings, supposedly unconstrained by
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historical time . Youngquist asserts that Blake's use of proper names does not fit the type of
symbolism that Frye describes: "Symbolism in Frye's sense does not legitimate historically
specific names" (609) . However, Youngquist overlooks Frye's description of Jerusalem , and
Blake's works in general, in terms of "how Blake interpreted the Bible, and how he placed that
interpretation in an English context" (Frye, Fearful Symmetry 357). On the other hand, Frye does
contradict this specification with the Biblical archetype: "the real relation to a predecessor is the
common relation of both to the archetypal vision" (356). Frye is not interested in the
particularities as an end but rather as a means to an end, that end being the general absorption of
all heterogeneous elements into a homogeneous pattern, in this case the Bible. That is to say, the
heterogeneous elements are those aspects that cause disturbances and ruptures in the
homogeneous archetypal pattern . For Youngquist the proper names Blake uses in Jerusalem are
heterogeneous and quite distinct from an archetypal pattern that is strictly blueprinted to the
Bible, particularly in localizing Blake's works biographically, with respect to Blake's use of
names from Blake's trial for sedition (610). Youngquist's analysis concentrates on those aspects
of Jerusalem that do not neatly fit a literary canonized poem that supposedly portrays an
archetypal pattern: "reading Jerusalem is a matter neither of extricating from its structure some
fixed and higher meaning nor of playing with its signs until signification itself yields
ecstasy . . .Any reading of Jerusalem proceeds in the present through alternative descriptions of
events, some of which become substantiated while others do not" (616). Thus, we come across
Frye's own words paraphrased in a different light, that "translation... always has to ignore many
aspects of the poet's original achievement" (Frye 419) .
Dominic Rainsford and Molly Anne Rothenberg both give similar discussions to Miller,
Adams and Youngquist in terms of addressing and engaging in the contemporary field of Blake
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criticism. Rainsford, in Authorship, Ethics, and the Reader: Blake, Dickens, Joyce, published in
1997, discusses Blake's poems in terms ofa larger context pertaining to the "ethical status of the
idea of the author" (1). Rainsford analyzes the relation of Blake's poetry to ethical concerns,
specifically with respect to whether Blake can be trusted for his moral self-representations of his
poetry as a medium for the revelation of divinity and the overall reconciliation of the world with
its fallen and overall depraved state. However, Rainsford interrogates the self-proclaimed ethical
and moral poet: "But just how reliable is Blake, this assemblage of textual voices and the man
who seems to stand behind them, as a source of wisdom" (13). For Rainsford, Jerusalem is not a
testimony to the perfection of the author and the author's vision ofa redeemed world; instead, it
is a testimony to Blake's wholeness as a real life human being, not a poet of a perfect vision, but
a poet who is as fallible as the fallen world he describes (Rainsford 94-95) . However, Rainsford
qualifies his analysis by claiming that acknowledging Blake's flaws is not an attack on Blake's
poetry and prose:
My point in drawing attention to signs of weakness in Blake, moments when he
appears to act or speak in opposition to certain principles which he may have
propounded in other places and at other times, has not been in any way to
condemn or diminish him as a human being, an artist, or a thinker: if anything,
they make him greater, more complete. (94)
Rainsford's analysis, like Adams', gives a close reading of some of Blake's verse, not an overly
generalized discussion.
In Rethinking Blake's Textuality, published in 1993, Rothenberg critiques Blake's poems
in terms of a heavily laden theoretical context that is arguably accessible only to readers
immersed in Rothenberg's terminology. Rothenberg posits a parallel claim thatJerusalem does
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not conform to a neat fit of a complete archetypal pattern, as a prototype to the Bible in the
heritage of the English literary tradition: "I have tried to produce an account of the poem that
does not pretend to any 'completeness' and that brings to the fore Blake's crucial revisions of
and responses to a predominantly discursive arena that, in his view, constantly contests (or
actively represses) the radical implications of the speculations that emerge within it" (3). On the
other hand, Rothenberg does admit that she runs the same risk of appealing to "completeness"
through exterior sources such as Immanuel Kant's philosophy (with which Rothenberg claims
Blake was acquainted), or other sources that may have influenced Blake 's ideas (3-4). In
addition, Rothenberg asserts that she departs completely from any predominant critical
consensus on Blake's works: "The refusal of all appeals to authority, the exposure of those
appeals as grounded on false or illegitimate premises, and the careful revelation of the strategies
by which such appeals are made to appear metaphysically valid - these concerns mark the
theoretical project of Jerusalem" (4-5). Having carefully qualified the discussion as on the one
hand teetering on the edge of discursive nihilism while on the other potentially falling prey to
what Youngquist would call formalist thematic appeals, Rothenberg dives head first into the bold
claim of rejecting all "appeals to authority" (even literary theory and criticism itself), which begs
the question of what can be read into Blake's verse from such a stance.
The aim of the present critical assessment of Blake criticism has been twofold: 1) to
illustrate the diversity of studies of Blake's writing over the past century, and 2) to place
particular focus on the variety of criticism in the past two decades, a variety that belies the
predominance of what many describe as archetypal and thematic readings which seem to force
an interpretation upon Blake's poems rather than engaging in what is already present within the
poetry and prose itself, even if such a study runs into severe contradictions in accord with
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inconsistencies that resist systemic interpretation and classification. Mid-twentieth-century
studies of Blake's poems share a critical consensus, as Bloom himself admits, with the advent of
Frye's "Bible," Fearful Symmetry, a persuasive reading of Blake's canon that one way or another
serves as a philosophical touchstone in understanding Blake's writing and ideas. However, the
critical consensus of Blake's writing has come under critical review with various departures from
predominant archetypal analyses. Youngquist describes the criticism of Jerusalem as on the
brink of a new interpretive field : "A new future awaits Jerusalem, one that attends scrupulously
to its complex narrativity. In passing beyond structure as a primary strategy for analysis,
criticism must entrust itself to the vagaries of discourse" (606). However, criticism of Blake's
writing must remain a balanced endeavor between a close analysis of Blake's verse itself and an
understanding of the various contexts and influences surrounding the shaping of Blake's ideas in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
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Chapter 2: Mysticism , Archetypal Vision and Michel de Certeau 's Mystics
"'Fable or Allegory are a totally distinct & inferior
kind of Poetry. Vision or Imagination isa
Representation of what Eternally Exists. Really
& Unchangeably . .. The Hebrew Bible & the
Gospel of Jesus are not Allegory but Eternal
Vision or Imaginat ion of All that Exists ."
(Blake, A Vision a/the Last Judgment 554)
The central concern of this chapter is whether Blake 's writing presents a clear vision of
the reconciliation of the fallen world through apocalypse or divine revelation , or whether Blake's
visionary writing is contradicted by a description of an ineffable , individual and therefore
indescribable experience , which Blake condemns in various ways throughout his work. I begin
with Damon and White's readings of Blake's mysticism, followed by Frye's response and the
subsequent predominant consensus that Blake 's poetry is visionary and not a form or expression
of mysticism . A series of descriptions and definitions of mysticism and vision follows ,
culminating in a discussion of de Certeau 's mystics with respect to Blake 's verse. Throughout
this comparative analysis it becomes clear that the same critical problem that is discussed in the
first chapter with respect to mid-twentieth century archetypal readings still crops up. In other
words, since there are many variations and understandings of the term mysticism (as I show in
the present chapter) , it is difficult to single out one notion of mysticism from its many possible
meanings. However, I do not here endorse any particular strain of mysticism as superior to
another; the intent of the present chapter is to display the multitudinous nature of mysticism and
to open the door for an alternative understanding of Blake 's works from a consideration of
mystic ism radically different from earlier claims regarding Blake 's words with respect to
particular forms of mysticism , both in critics who favor reading Blake's poems in terms of
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mysticism and those who argue it is erroneous to interpret Blake's poetry and prose through the
lens of mysticism.
The Central Debate: Mystic or Visionary?
Damon discusses Blake's poems in' terms of five stages of the mystic's development:
(I) the awakening to a sense of divine reality; (2) the consequent
purgation of the Self, when it realizes its own imperfections; (3) an
enhanced return of the sense of the divine order, after the Selfhas
achieved its detachment from the world; (4) the 'Dark Night of the
Soul,' or the crucifixion of the Self in the absence of the divine; (5) and
the complete union with Truth, the attainment of that which the third state
had perceived as a possibility.
Blake passed through these identical five states. His complete works, which are an
accurate record of his life, fall into these same divisions. The first three states are
named by him 'Innocence; 'Experience,' and 'Revolution.' The fourth state was
passed in silence; while the fifth state was a return to 'Innocence' with the added
wisdom of 'Experience.' (Damon 2)
Damon takes these stages, or states, as the blueprint for the development of both Blake as an
individual and as a poet. Parallel with the stages of the mystic's development, Damon situates
Jerusalem in the last stage, mirroring Blake's own emergence from the "dark night of the soul"
into union with divinity, although Damon finds many inconsistencies in Blake's final epic poem:
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It is perfectly evident ... that Blake had not developed his narrative powers. There
are many incoherences, and even some contradictions ... The surmise is that
Blake did not conceive the fall as one steady act, but as a spiral alternating
upward and downward . . . [Blake] undoubtedly preferred accurate psychology to
an over-simplified map of the Mystic Way [i.e. the five stages ofthe mystic's
development]. (193)
However, Damon qualifies this description of Blake's "narrative powers" by claiming that
Blake's "vision" nevertheless still shines through in the form of his teachings and aphorisms:
"Obscure as Blake's plot may be, his teachings are never in doubt. Cloudy as his Eternity may
seem, his 'spiritual arrows' are sharp and well aimed" (195). Turgid and murky though it may
be, Jerusalem is, according to Damon, resplendent with transparent didacticism, a moral teaching
through the example of the mystic's journey through the fall and rise of his or her own soul, as in
the case of Blake and his poetry.
In a similar analysis, Helen C. White studies Blake's works in terms of a potential,
instead of specific, form of mysticism, interpreting Blake's poems through an open-ended
possibility of whether Blake's writing is mystical or visionary. White's intent is quite different
from Damon's, especially in her discussion of the myriad of definitions and historical figures
often associated with mysticism. She divides them into three potential categories: "typical
mystic," prophet, and visionary. Each of these has other divisions such that a "typical mystic" is
to be distinguished from a marginal one (52). As with Damon, White concludes that Blake's
mysticism is a testimony to clarity and a transparency of vision, "There is no suggestion of the
ineffable in these lines" (205). White's discussion does not engage in a close reading of Blake's
verse, instead concentrating on a discussion of various types of mystics and forms of mysticism.
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Of particular interest is White's claim throughout her discussion that the prophet and vis ionary
are explained through the concept of the mystic: "the discussion of the issues raised by the first
[mysticism] will cover much of the ground of the other two [prophet and visionary]" (208). For
White, mysticism is in some sense the ineffable, the belief in or experience of a supernatural
reality that is latent in and interconnected with the present reality, analogous to many paradigms
of heaven and earth, although in terms of mysticism this world can be experienced but not
tangibly grasped or consciously known (208-209). However, in conclusion White dismisses
many of Blake's works, "by which he himself set most store," as well as his illuminations and
"pictorial art" (245). However, it is difficult to separate Blake's verse, the corpus of his ideas, in
"which he himself set most store," from his "pictorial art" since almost all of Blake's verse is
illuminated with visual art. White describes Blake's verse in terms ofa fixed pattern in his
"pictorial art," yet the verse remains, and remains unexplored, presumed to yield nothing but
contradiction and disorder. As generally stated above, Northrop Frye completely dismisses a
mystical reading of Blake's works and ideas in reaction to interpretations such as those offered
by White or Damon.
Frye responds directly to Damon's claim that the "key" to reading Blake's poems lies in
an understanding of Blake's mysticism, particularly as Frye uses the identical word "key" to
affirm that there is no "open-sesame formula" that can unlock the ambiguities and narrative
problems found in Blake's larger epic poems. For Frye, mysticism denotes a particular field of
subjective experience in terms of a specific understanding of what exactly defines mysticism:
[Mysticism] means a certain kind of religious technique difficult to
reconcile with anyone's poetry. It is a form of spiritual communion with
God which is by its nature incommunicable to anyone else, and which
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soars beyond faith into direct apprehension. But to the artist ... this
apprehension is not an end in itself but a means to another end, the end of
producing his poem. The mystical experience for him is poetic material,
not poetic form, and must be subordinated to the demands of that form.
From the point of view of any genuine mystic this would be somewhat
inadequate, and one who was both mystic and poet, never finally deciding
which was to be adjective and which the noun, might be rather badly off.
If he decided for poetry, he would perhaps do better to use someone else's
mystical experiences. (Fearful Symmetry 7-8)
In this passage, Frye argues for a subject-oriented notion of mysticism, individuated to personal
experience, an experience "incommunicable" to others. Moreover, Frye claims that "genuine"
mystics would deem the "poetic form" insufficient for communicating the mystical experience to
others. However, is Frye here arguing for an objective field of experience, thereby arguing
against individual communion with divinity with the added ramification that all mystical
experience must boil down to the same archetype? Frye then posits that poets would be better off
using "someone else's mystical experiences" instead of their own personal experience. Frye
overlooks Blake's comment "I must Create a System, or be enslav'd by another Mans," which
could clearly be read as contradicting Frye's claim that poets ought to appeal to "someone else's
mystical experiences." Frye's point is valid, and Blake does appeal to other experiences in his
poetry and prose, although Blake also states, as noted above, that "Imitation is Criticism,"
meaning that even if Blake uses other experiences that are not his own, he uses them critically,
and not in terms of an exact replica which leads to a homogeneous archetypal pattern.
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Frye asserts that Blake 's poems are most aptly characterized as visionary rather than
mystical: "most of the poets generally called mystics might better be called visionaries, which is
not quite the same thing . This is a word Blake uses , and uses constantly. A visionary creates , or
dwells in, a higher spiritual world in which the objects of perception in this one have become
transfigured and charged with a new intensity of symbolism ... It is a perceptive rather than a
contemplative attitude of mind" (8). Frye separates the perceptive from the contemplative, or
reflective, in the sense that the perceptive is a clarity of vision, that is attained through the
reconciliation of the world with its fallen and twisted state, and that this represents the best
interpretive model for understanding Blake 's works. Furthermore, Frye distinguishes Blake's
poems from mysticism through the example of Plot inus, who "four times in his life, with great
effort and relentless discipline , achieved a direct apprehension of God" (8), in comparison to
Blake who claimed to be in direct communion with God every waking day, which to someone
like Plotinus , who is a "genuine mystic ," would constitute disrespect and blasphemy.
Frye adds to his comments on mysticism in the concluding "General Note : Blake 's
Mysticism," in which he further identifies vision as overcoming the philosophical dichotomy
between the subject and object , a problematic contradiction dating back to Plato:
The true God for ... visionaries is not the orthodox Creator , the Jehovah ... who
must always be involved with either an eternal substance or an eternal
nothingness, depending on the taste of the theologian, but an unattached creative
Word free from both. Unity with this God could be attained only by an effort of
vision which not only rejects the duality of subject and object but attacks the far
more difficult antithesis of being and non-being as well. This effort of vision .. . is
to be conceived neither as a human attempt to reach God nor a divine attempt to
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reach man, but as the realization in total experience of the identity of God and
man in which both the human creature and the superhuman Creator disappear.
(431)
Frye covers a lot of territory in this passage, referring primarily to the relationship between
language and divinity in terms of the feasibility of the endeavor to express the divine clearly
through the figurative and symbolic medium of language or what Frye designates as the
"unattached creative Word." In his conclusion to the general note, Frye appeals to the
"prodigious and unthinkable metamorphosis of the human mind" (432), connecting his
comments on mysticism to his earlier description of an archetypal pattern. For Frye, Blake's
works serve as a precursor, constructed out of twentieth-century theories "which seem to demand
some kind of fitting together," leading to an idyllic "whole pattern" (425). It is clear that Frye's
attack on interpretations of Blake's poetry as mystical is directly connected with his argument for
a poetic archetypal pattern that furnishes proof of an even larger blueprint that subsumes duality,
whether subject-object or being-nonbeing, to an ideal "unattached creative Word."
Frye's argument for a visionary reading of Blake's works influenced other major Blake
critics such as David V. Erdman and Harold Bloom. Erdman also characterizes Blake's poetry
and prose as visionary, claiming that interpretations that emphasize that Blake is a mystic poet
fail "to recognize that the community of London artists which was Blake's only college was a
milieu that encouraged visionaries - not those who had 'ineffable' but those who had vivid and
distinct revelations" (3). Erdman argues that Blake's ideas present a transparent revelation as
opposed to an opaque or "ineffable" mysticism. Bloom does not offer a lengthy argument against
a mystical reading, although at certain points throughout his discussion he takes a similar stance
to that of Frye and Erdman. For example, Bloom analyzes a passage from Jerusalem that could
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be construed as mystical and asserts that the passage should not be read as in "any way mystical"
(410). In the passage, the narrator declares and pleads, "Annihilate the Selfhood in me"
(Jerusalem 5.22). Bloom claims that the passage clearly refers to Blake's previous epic poem,
Milton, in which the character Milton attempts to rid himself of "the Not Human, to cast off the
rotten rags of every covenanted religi on, and indeed to liberate the spirit from every convention
of belief, every shred of institutional or historical Christianity" (410). Bloom also argues against
a mystical reading for a clear and transparent interpretation grounded in actualizing on a real life
scale the reconciliation of the world with its diseased condition, in the practical release from
"every convention of belief," whether "institutional or historical."
Recently, certain Blake critics , such as Asloob Ahmad Ansari and Sheila A. Spector,
offer a specific understanding of mysticism in the Jewish tradition. In "Blake and the Kabbalah, "
published in 1969, Ansari discusses Blake's borrowings from Jewish culture, particularly with
respect to Jewish mysticism, or the Kabbalah: "Blake, like Milton, did owe something to the
Hebraic sources" (199). However, Ansari gives a generalized discussion in terms of a universal
understanding of Jewish mysticism, hich does not address the specific form of Jewish
mysticism that Blake would have known. In "Kabbalistic Sources: Blake's and His Critics',"
published in I984, Spector discusses the particular strains of Jewish mysticism that Blake would
have been acquainted with in terms of the evolution of this field of mysticism in the context of
and under the influence of Christianity:
As is true with any study of influence, the only way to determine how - or even if
- Blake knew or used the Kabbalah [i.e. Jewish mysticism] is to go to his source
of information ... however, we cannot rely on modern scholarship even for
rudimentary backgrou nd information, for the kind of Kabbalah available in
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eighteenth-century England was far different from that published at any time
during the following two hundred years ... Blake ... had no access to anything
other than the distorted interpretations of the Latin kabbalists. (96)
Spector's discussion of Blake's affiliation with Jewish mysticism is modified by her claim that if
one compares Blake's poems with Jewish mysticism in terms of Blake's intent in borrowing
from "Hebraic sources," then one ought to be aware of the specific type of Jewish mysticism
available in England during Blake's time.
From Mysticism and Vision to Mystics
This section focuses on various definitions and descriptions of mysticism and vision,
beginning with Evelyn Underhill's study of mysticism and vision, followed by studies in the
same field by Jewish scholar Gershom Scholem, American literary critic Sheila A. Spector and
philosopher Steven T. Katz, and concludes with a brief exposition of Michel de Certeau's
mystics. I have yet to make any claim or argument "on Blake's behalf," meaning I have not
acknowledged that Blake admittedly labels himself profusely as a visionary, as Frye, Erdman
and Bloom correctly point out. However, I posit here that Blake's intent might not be as relevant
as some critics maintain. Surely, Blake would not be the first poet who, intentionally or not,
misrepresented his own art. Moreover, my use of the terms mystical, mysticism and visionary are
only general so far, leaving unanswered the following questions: What is a mystic? What is a
vision? Is there a substantial difference between the two? And lastly, how do the answers to
these questions bear on our understanding of Blake's poetry and prose?
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Underhill's work serves as a good point of departure in discussing mysticism since she
writes at the beginning of the twentieth century, and because it is from her work that Damon
takes his understanding of the mystical element in Blake's poems. Underhill is therefore
indirectly the source of the description of mysticism that Frye and others criticize in their
subsequent studies in favor of a visionary interpretation. Like Damon, Underhill discusses five
stages of the mystic's development. For Underhill, mysticism is a transparent revelation instead
of an ineffable secret:
I understand it to be the expression of the innate tendency of the human
spirit towards complete harmony with the transcendental order; whatever
be the theological formula under which that order is understood. This
tendency, in great mystics, gradually captures the whole field of
consciousness; it dominates their life and, in the experience called "mystic
union," attains its end. Whether that end be called the God of Christianity,
the World-soul of Pantheism, the Absolute of Philosophy, the desire to
attain it and the movement towards it - so long as this is a genuine life
process and not an intellectual speculation - is the proper subject of
mysticism. (xiv-xv; italics mine)
In this passage, Underhill speaks vaguely of a "transcendental order," referred to throughout the
rest of the passage as "it," and described as a union with the divine, no matter what "end" is the
context. This point is emphasized in Spector's analysis of potential sources of influence with
respect to Blake's poems, although Spector gives a detailed account of mysticism whereas
Underhill's discussion contains a more generalized definition.
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Of particular interest is Underhill's claim that the visionary and the mystical are fields of
experience completely and unequivocally at odds with each other. Vision is described as a
perceptive, clear, concrete experience in opposition to mysticism, which is an obscure, elusive,
opaque and generally ineffable occurrence (279). On the other hand, Underhill notes that it is
very difficult to communicate visionary experience, if we take into account the similar criticism
against vision that is usually leveled at the incommunicable nature of a mystical experience: "We
forget . .. that it is impossible for those who have never heard a voice or seen a vision to discuss
these matters with intelligence ... No second-hand account can truly report the experience of the
person whose perceptions or illusions present themselves in this form" (279). Underhill favors
the mystical over the visionary, or at least demonstrates that the same problem affects both - the
problem of communicating a personal experience through any means of representation.
Moreover, Underhill asserts that mystics have a general tendency to discredit perception as
somehow polluting the experience of eternity, which is a contradiction since the only way any
individual can experience divinity is through some mode of perception, whether abstract
meditation or a physical vision .
From a different angle, Underhill claims that vision is a "means" to mystical experience,
in terms of being a mode of representation not simply of communicating these experiences
between individuals but also being the mode of representation for experience (297). In other
words, the mystic's "mystical" experience, the actual occurrence of what Underhill describes as
"union" with the divine, can itself only be mediated through the individual's consciousness,
However, Underhill would disagree with this extension of her argument as it takes away from the
purity of the mystic's experience by taking the experience down to the level of representation, a
fact which may explain Frye's insistence on Blake's unattached Creative word; an approach that
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circumvents the notion that representation, in this case the representative medium of language,
somehow pollutes the attainment of the description of divinity.
Gershom Scholem discusses mysticism in terms of religious-historical struggles over
dogmatic systems, revolutionary spirituality, and the hegemony of orthodox institutions.
Scholem describes the mystic much in the same way as Underhill: "A mystic is a man who has
beenfavored with an immediate, and to him-real, experience of the divine, of ultimate reality, or
who at least strives to attain such experience" (On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism 5; italics
mine). The mystical experience is often described as a union with divinity, not an observation
that can be easily passed on or communicated. Scholem gives more detail in his discussion of
mysticism, explaining that various descriptions of mysticism penetrate beyond matters of the
corporeal, physical world to the degree that language fails to portray the experience:
Because mystical experience as such is formless, there is in principle no limit to
the forms it can assume. At the beginning of their path, mystics tend to describe
their experience in forms drawn from the world of perception. At later stages ...
the world of nature recedes, and these 'natural' forms are gradually replaced by
specifically mystical structures. Nearly all the mystics known to us describe such
structures as configurations oflights and sounds ... For light and sound and even
the name of God are merely symbolic representations of an ultimate reality which
is unformed, amorphous. (8)
The forms from the "world of perception" that the mystic uses to describe mystical experience
are the particular contextual religious constructs, such as Christianity, which informs the
mystic's mode of understanding and subsequent communication of the experience to others: "the
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mystic's experience tends to confirm the religious authority under which he lives; its theology
and symbol are projected into his mystical experience, but do not spring from it" (9).
Scholem is similar to Underhill in his differentiation of the terms of mysticism, prophecy
and vision. Placing vision within the category of prophecy, Scholem asserts that mysticism is not
to be confused with prophecy or vice versa:
The prophet hears a clear message and sometimes beholds an equally plain
vision, which he also remembers clearly. Undoubtedly a prophetic
message of this sort lays direct claim to religious authority. In this it
differs fundamentally from mystical experience. And yet, no one would
think of denying the prophet's immediate experience of the divine.
Plainly, we are dealing with two distinct categories of experience, and I
very much doubt whether a prophet can justifiably be called a mystic ...
[the] mystic's experience is by its very nature indistinct and inarticulate, while
the prophet's message is clear and specific ... Though many mystics have
attempted such 'translation,' have tried to lend their experience form and
body [i.e. interpretation], the center of what a mystic has to say always
remains a shapeless experience. (10-11)
Unlike Underhill, Scholem does not criticize prophecy and vision for the same fallacy inherent in
mysticism wherein the experience is individual, subjective, and therefore incommunicable.
Instead, Scholem claims that vision and prophecy are experiences of the divine, "ultimate
reality" and yet somehow can perfectly be communicated to others as well. What is ineffable and
what is transparent? How are the two "distant categories of experience," which are both
experiences of the same divinity, to be distinguished if their end is the same? Admittedly, the
37
experience of a visionary and prophet is quite different than a mystic's insofar as the former is a
vision of divinity that can be communicated to the public domain whereas the latter is a solitary,
individual experience meant solely for the individual and is therefore incommunicable to society.
The problem is partially solved by Scholern's observation that the reason prophets have a "claim
to religious authority," is to circumvent the contradiction that the prophet's experience of the
divine is translatable while the mystic's experience is not.
The difference seems to rest upon the opposite intentions of mystics and visionaries,
although Scholem demonstrates that these contrary intentions are not simply individual motives
and choices. Scholem posits other contributing factors such as the particular religious symbolic
context, or whether the mystic desires to change and revolutionize the predominant religious
model or reinforce already existent structures and institutions: "For the same experience, which
in one case makes for a conservative attitude, can in another case foster a diametrically opposite
attitude. A mystic may substitute his own opinion for that prescribed by authority, precisely
because his opinion seems to stem from the very same authority" (9). However, whatever the
description of the experience, whether mystic or prophetic, it is simply that- an experience. In a
different study, published in 1997, Scholem argues that a union with divinity is impossible as a
description of mysticism, that instead mysticism is a "consciousness or experience of divine
matters" (On the Possibility ofJewish Mysticism 7). Thus, Scholem focuses on symbolism in his
studies of mysticism, since, "Symbols, by their very nature, are a means of expressing an
experience that is in itself expressionless ... The richness of meaning that they seem to emanate
lends new life to tradition, which is always in danger of freezing dead forms - and this process
continues until the symbols themselves die or change" (On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism 22).
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Mystics take long-established symbols and, even in respecting their traditional dimension,
reinterpret their significance.
An example can be found in Blake's Book ofUrizen, a minor prophetic that takes the
Christian creation myth found in Genesis and gives it a dark and satirical representation,
although the Book ofUrizen might not be construed as a "pious veneration," but as an outright
rebellious attack on Christian theology. Scholem briefly describes Blake's poetry in terms ofa
trend that does not appeal to religious authority with respect to what he calls a secular
understanding of mysticism:
This problem of the secularized interpretation of amorphous mystical experiences
has been raised repeatedly since the Enlightenment. The situation is somewhat
obscured by the fact that certain authors, disregarding or rejecting all traditional
authority, describe their mystical experience in resolutely secular terms, yet clothe
their interpretation of the same experience in traditional images. This is the case
... with William Blake ... Even in such revolutionaries, who seek their authority
essentially in themselves and in a secular interpretation of their visions, tradition
asserts its power. (16)
Scholem states that Blake's experience is mystical on the one hand and visionary on the other,
and therefore interchanges mysticism for vision or mysticism for prophecy, possibly owing to
Blake's references to himself as dealing in vision and not obscurities or ineffable experiences.
However, Scholem does not explain this statement, and we observe how one of the most
specialized scholars of mysticism can become entangled in the gray area between mysticism and
vision, an area of unrelenting debate between an ineffable, untranslatable or a clear, coherent
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experience that can be communicated to other people; between what Scholem labels "two
distinct categories of experience."
Spector addresses the debate over ineffable mysticism and transparent vision in "Death in
Blake's Major Prophecies," published in 1984. Spector argues that the inconsistencies and
contradictions found in Blake's epic poems are not symptoms of an ineffable mysticism, though
they are elements of a mysticism that she claims are overlooked or ignored . For her, the
traditional understanding of mysticism is outdated:
It used to be axiomatic that mystical visions are ineffable. Since by definition the
mystical experience exceeds the dimensions of physical reality, it was believed
that only those who themselves had transcended our world of time and space
could comprehend reports of other, similar experiences, and that language
traditionally used to describe the ... world is inadequate for conveying visions of
another dimension. As a result, the mystic who claimed that words failed him was
taken literally, and the mystical testimony was assumed to be unintelligible except
as a statement that some kind of mystical experience had occurred. (3)
Spector argues that the interpretation of mysticism is changing, and that the ineffable
characteristic generally associated with mysticism (that it is incommunicable), is ccnfused
equivocally with the particulars of individual experiences: "each [mystical experience] is unique
and ineffable" (3). In order to surpass the obstacle of ineffability, Spector claims that critical
focus should be placed on the contextual theological particulars that shape and inform the
individual mystical experience. In Blake's case, this amounts to assessing the influence of
Blake's immediate biographical, intellectual and religious-spiritual context upon his "mystical"
experience and subsequent poetic illuminations.
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Spector interchanges vision and mysticism, not acknowledging, as in the case of
Underhill, Frye, Erdman and Scholem, the difference between transparent, definable, translatable
vision (or prophecy) and opaque, indefinable, amorphous mystical experience. Instead, Spector
compresses vision and mysticism together, defining each as potentially ineffable or transparent,
rather than combining mysticism with the unknowable and vision with the identifiable. Spector
claims that the solution to understanding the .ineffable aspect of mystical and visionary
experience lies in what is called a "mystical grammar," which describes the author's intent to
utilize inconsistency, paradox and contradiction purposefully. In other words, where paradox and
contradiction are presumed to be mistakes, Spector argues that the author intends these elements:
Very often, the mystic views himself as a teacher or guide, and the vision,
not merely the passive transcription of a personal experience, is the means
of leading the reader out of his own limited sense of reality, as controlled
by a self-limiting use of language, into the spiritual freedom gained from
transcending a physical world view. Thus, the mystic's apparently
illogical use oflanguage is not only deliberate, but logical in its own way,
predicated on ... a "mystical grammar," the means of both shaping
language into an instrument suitable for conveying his vision and, at the
same time, providing the willing reader with the means of breaking free
from his own linguistic limitations.
We no longer need assume that inconsistencies and contradictions
reflect either the vagaries of an illogical mind or an ineffable experience
which cannot be described. (4)
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For Spector, then, mysticism and vision can be interpreted in a number of ways, and to describe
an experience as ineffable is a matter of perspective. In terms of poetry and prose, Spector asserts
that paradoxical, inconsistent language is not necessarily a symptom of an indescnbable,
ineffable experience but instead is an intent ional use on the author's behalf to take the "reader
out of his own limited sense of reality." Spector demonstrates that what is largely depicted as
unknowable due to contradiction is misread and misinterpreted, or discussed in such a way that
describes the paradoxes but "neither interprets nor attempts to resolve them" (6).
Spector derives part of her contextual approach from Steven T. Katz, who emphasizes
that the vehicle for mystical experience is the human body and thus focus should begin with the
modes of representation and signification tluough which the body expresses itself. Katz reminds
us that in any study of mysticism and mystical experiences, we are dealing primarily with what is
actually secondary and sometimes even tertiary to the object of study - the mystical experience .
The only evidence we have of mystical experiences is to be found secondhand in writing: "We
have no access to their special experience independently of these texts. What we call the great
historical mystical traditions of the world are in fact a series of documents of differing sorts. No
one has any privileged access here to the original mystics' experience outside its textual
incorporation" (4). Not only is the "origina mystics' experience" inaccessible and presented
secondarily at best, but the writing itself, the recording of the experience, whether factual or
poetic, is "encoded" with the direct context of the individual mystic (4).
For example, Blake's writing is "encoded," with the historical context of his time, not
simply in terms of events that shaped Blake's life, but the style and structure of his writing as
well influences the interpretation of his poetry and prose today. Not only would the historical and
biographical particulars of Blake's life influence his experience (whether described as mystical
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or visionary), but the style of his recording those experiences affects and dilutes that experience
further, making it difficult at best to ascertain the predominant characteristic of Blake's
experience with respect to whether it can be generally defined as mystical or visionary. Katz's
central point, then, is to illustrate how our understanding of mysticism, and I would venture of
visionary experiences as well, is already predetermined by the mystic's particular historical
conditioning, a notion that has already been "alluded to above by Underhill and Scholem in their
studies of mysticism.
The final perspective of mysticism, Michel de Certeau's mystics, criticizes most of the
scholarship and academic work that has defined mysticism, since many of the scholars and
thinkers who give these definitions are not mystics and have not had mystical experiences. For
de Certeau, since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, mysticism is predefined before being
defined at all:
In the course of our history, "one" place has been given to mysticism; it
has been assigned, within social or scientific life, a region of its own, with
its own objects, itineraries, and language. In particular ... since the
sixteenth or seventeenth century ... one no longer designated as mystical
that form of "wisdom" elevated by a full recognition of the mystery
already lived and announced in common beliefs, but rather an
experimental knowledge that slowly detached itself from traditional
theology or church institutions, characterized by the consciousness,
received or acquired, of a fulfilling passivity in which the self loses itself
in God. In other words, what becomes mystical is that which diverges
from normal or ordinary paths ... on the margins of an increasingly
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secularized society and a knowledge that defines its own scientific
objects. (The Mystic Fable 13)
De Certeau maintains that around the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the adjective "mystical"
changed from a descriptive word into a noun and a category: "Previously, 'mystique' [i.e.
mystical] was only an adjective that qualified something else ... At the same time that its proper
name appeared ... mysticism [having become a noun] constituted itself in a place apart" (13-14).
This shift from adjective to noun, from mystical to mysticism, is accompanied and partly
determined by "a knowledge that defines its own scientific objects," which is, according to de
Certeau, knowledge associated with the rapidly evolving and pervasive discipline of science. For
de Certeau, the advent of secular studies, the predominance of science and the hegemony of
observable, empirical "data," demarcates and defines the field of mysticism in such a way that
ignores mysticism itself and predefines "its own scientific objects."
The core of de Certeau' s argument directly reflects the argument of this thesis with
respect to Blake's writing and the idea of mysticism that has been posited and denied in Blake's
works. In the same way that science defines its own objects, archetypal analysis of Blake's
poetry and prose defines its own interpretation, and thereby ignores and overlooks particulars
that belie the archetypal reading. In a different study involving a discussion of the predominance
of scientific thinking, published in 1984, de Certeau asserts that science delineates its own
"proper" field in which it "defines its own objects": "Statistical inquiry [the mode of science]
breaking down ... [knowledge] ... into units it defines itself ... reorganizing the results of its
own analyses according to its own codes, 'finds' only the homogenous" (The Practice of
Everyday Life xviii). Miller makes similar comments in his discussion of Blake criticism and the
archetype, such Blake 's writings are revealed to homogenize into one pattern, placing on the
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margins those aspects that would disrupt the archetypal reading such as Frye does in defining a
mysticism incompatib e with Blake's poems. Frye does not allow for any noaion of mysticism
other than the one he p osits and then denies with respect to Blake's writing.
Marsanne Brammer describes de Certeau's mysticism: "The scientifi.c objectification of
the mystical reveals m.ore about the developing sociocultural predominance ~f certain analytical
practices [i.e. scientific reason] than it doesabout mystical experience itself. Mysticism is neither
a religion nor a philosophy, but is grounded in lived experiences and practices that are
heterogeneous, nonlinear, particular" (29). In much the same way, archetypal interpretation
reveals more about the nature of the pervasive, generalizing archetype of literary studies than it
does about the literatu e itself, presuming that what is being interpreted fits t he mold of the
archetypal pattern. De Certeau adds to his work on mysticism in his study, The Mystic Fable,
published in 1992, wh.ich reinforces his earlier stance in the article "Mystici esm," also published
in I992. Here, de Cerneau elaborates on the shift in mysticism around the sixteemh, seventeenth
century, in this case emphasizing that the advent of the printing press and th concurrent
availability of the Bib e to the public, forced mystics to question what remai ns after the written
word:
From tile Reformation on, the Scriptures opened up the road .0writing and
literacy. The primacy of the book was established. The cosmos spoken of by God
and chairch institutions is replaced by the production and methodical learning of
an elementary or theological knowledge, a 'clericalization' 0 religious authority,
an adrrainistrative technicalization of the Churches, and so 0 . (12)
Blake invokes this po- nt through the lines quoted above, "I must Create a S~stem, or be enslav'd
by another Mans," altllough in this case "another Mans" "System" is the ins titutionalization and
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s-:ystematization of the Church, a point Blake variously illustrates throughout his poetry and
~rose .
De Certeau traces what he calls the evolutionary history of mysticism. The core of
rtrlysticism remains the same for de Certeau throughout this historical evolution; it is the
lIlnderstanding and importance of this core (the core being the mystical experience itself) that is
iin a constant fluctuation. For example, the present discussion demonstrates the fluctuation of the
Ulnderstanding of mysticism with respect to Blake's works in terms of the many alternative
interpretations of Blake's mysticism. These interpretations do not reduce to the duality between
()i)paque mysticism and transparent vision, but are instead irreducible particular readings of
IBlake's works which each yield a specific description of mysticism or vision. De Certeau asserts
tkhat mystics (la mystique) is the actual field of mystical experience, not the definitions and
di escriptions that have been handed down throughout history. The translator of de Certeau's
N\1ystic Fable. Michael B. Smith, translates "la mystique" into mystics:
This term cannot be rendered accurately by the English word 'mysticism,' which
would correspond rather to the French Ie mysticisme, and be far too generic and
essentialist a term to convey the historical specificity of this study. There is no
need here to retrace the steps by which la mystique, the noun, emerged from the
prior adjective, mystique ... it may be of some interest to note that this
grammatical promotion has its parallel ... in the development of such terms as
'mathematics' or 'physics' ... also taking their names from an adjectival
forerunner. I have ... adopted the bold solution of introducing ... [an] English
term, mystics ... to render la mystique. (ix-x)
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De Certeau claims that mystics could not last, that it was inherently doomed to failure. As
soon as mystics became more than an adjective, taking on the status of a specialized discipline, it
died out:
Once it had become .. . a noun, mystics had to determine its procedures and
define its object. Although ... it succeeded in carrying out the first part of
this program, the second part was to prove impossible. Is not its object the
infinite. It is never anything but the unstable metaphor for what is
inaccessible . .. Therefore, mystics only assembles and orders its practices
in the name of something that it cannot make into an object . . . something
that never ceases judging mystics at the same time that it eludes it.
Mysticism vanishes at its point of origin. Its birth pledges it to the
impossible, as if, stricken by the absolute from the very beginning, it
finally died of the question from which it was formed.
For a while, this science [mystics] was sustained only by the poem ... The
poem was the substitute for its scientific object. It was a paradoxical
alliance. (77)
In this passage, de Certeau discusses the "object," of mystics, which is the mystical experience
itself, not the interpretation of that experience. For example, the object of physics would be the
physical dynamics of the universe, and the interpretations offered by physicists are presented in
terms of theories and formulas. However, the interpretation of mystics is continuously and
consistently disrupted and sabotaged by the experience itself. Thus, I further designate the term
mysticism as the field of interpretation that manifests after the experience itself, whereas mystics
refers to the field of mystical experience, as it happens and not after the fact. In this relation,
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mysticism can never fully expound what occurs in mystics, directly relating to Underhill's
comment that mysticism can never be an intellectual reflection but is an active, engaging and
lived experience that defies any rigid systematization.
Furthermore, de Certeau elaborates that the demise of the authentic discipline or science,
mystics, was predominantly accompanied by the scientific field's homogenizing descriptions and
definitions of mysticism, particularly those created and maintained by "psychology or
pathology" (Mystic Fable 77). In other words, with the advent of psychology and pathology
came the psychological and pathological assessment and judgment of mysticism and mystical
experience in terms of "normal" modes of behavior and deviations from the status quo such that
mystical experiences were reevaluated as symptomatic of madness and delusion. Josephine A.
McQuail uses de Certeau's study of mystics to argue against a psychoanalytic reading of Blake's
writing and ideas, particularly de Certeau's notion that mysticism is predefined by other
disciplines, such as psychology and psychoanalysis, as indicative of erratic, deranged and absurd
behavior. McQuail asserts that the subject matter of both mysticism and psychoanalysis is
essentially the same, but in a bid for legitimacy psychoanalysis categorizes mystical experience
as indicative of deep-rooted mental illnesses, traumas, and other pathologies of the mind.
However, McQuail argues that "psychoanalysis cannot explain prophecy except to say it is a
neurosis" (131) . Whether an unconscious pathology designated by psychoanalytic theory or an
experience depicted as mystical, McQuail claims that neither is exactly definitive in interpreting
Blake's inspiration and art: "was it neurosis or divine inspiration ... was he exploring the
unconscious or the soul? After all, neither has been isolated as a physiological entity" (131).
In his own life, Blake was often labeled a deluded mystic while the reception of his art
suffered similar criticisms. Blake himself was aware of the potential for being seen as a lunatic:
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"There are states in which ali Visionary Men are accounted Mad" ("The Laocoon 274). Blake
often criticized science for t hese very same reasons - for defining and constricting through
scientific "logic" other possibilities, specifically spiritual in nature, that are manipulated into
unobservable and therefore irrelevant data by the discourse of science. In Jerusalem, John Locke,
Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton form the scientific trinity who represent the cold logic of the
fallen world in creating and maintaining a fallen perception aligned with a fallen reality:
That I may a wake Albion from his long & cold repose .
For Bacon and Newton sheathd in dismal steel, their terrors hang
Like iron scourges over Albion, Reasonings like vast Serpents
Infold around my limbs, bruising my minute articulations
I tum my eyes to the Schools & Universities of Europe
And there behold the Loom of Locke whose Woof rages dire
Washd by the Water-wheels of Newton. (Blake, Jerusalem 15.10-16)
Albion is not a figurative symbol of the world but the actual physical universe (not to be
confused with the Albion that represents the British Isles from which Blake takes the name),
constituted by and through his body, a fact which leads into another significant point de Certeau
makes with respect to myst ics and the notion of the body. For de Certeau, the body is the site of
mystics, both its vehicle through mystical experience and subsequent interpretation: "Mystical
literature composes scripts of the body. From this point of view, it is cinematographic" (81). The
predominant example of this occurrence is the story of Jesus Christ, whose body, de Certeau
argues, "composes" the script of the entire Christian tradition, a tradition that is based on blind
faith (81-82). De Certeau describes the Christian tradition as a "privation of body," one that is
complemented by blind faith to the figure of Jesus Christ, whose body signals faith in the unseen
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and unknown. For example, Jesus' resurrection has the impact of testing the Apostles' faith,
particularly if we consider, as de Certeau illustrates, the story of "doubting Thcmas," in which
Thomas did not believe Jesus had risen from the dead, although in this case Jesis appears and
gives observable evidence to prove to Thomas that he had indeed died and corteback from the
dead, thus giving Thomas the infamous aphoristic acronym. Thus, in this Biblicalstory, Jesus'
body composes the script in being the site of a tension between the human capacities for faith
and doubt.
More importantly, the body of Jesus serves as a rhetorical piece of evidencewhose
presence is proof to have blind faith, as we see in the story of "doubting Thomas."The Bible,
both New and Old Testaments, is riddled with similar stories that are composedof bodies-
bodies being healed, miracles performed, tortures inflicted, and so on, all of whichyield some
ethic or moral. As well, these occurrences are experiences that can be doubted unless one is
actually a witness to the event, a description that fits mystical experience as well.The body
serves as a site for argument and invention, for creating hegemonic institutions, maintaining their
predominance, defining the marginal such as the mystical experience, giving ita pathology and
statistically dividing between the two poles of coherent religion and pathological, deluded
mysticism. In this light, it is no small wonder that critics who want to critique Blake's writing in
terms of its literary heritage would have to subtly dismiss the mystical question, for mysticism
involves a field of experience that is anything but stable, fixed, or archetypal, by and through its
very definition. De Certeau consistently admits that even his own discussion ofmystics is
doomed from the outset because of the impossibility of communicating the mysticalexperience,
although he simultaneously reminds us of the contradiction that we still attempt to communicate
the incommunicable, as de Certeau does in his study of mystics. For de Certeau, the problem is
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summed up in his phrase (quoted above), "The sayable continues to be wounded by the
unsayable" (78). I investigate this problem in Blake's works, particularly his final epic,
Jerusalem. If Blake does have a clear vision in mind, one that he wishes to convey to others
through his poetry, then does he succeed in communicating his clear archetypal vision? Does he
find a "sayable," a vision that is coherently presented throughout the one hundred illuminated
plates that constitute Jerusalem or is there an "unsayable" that continuously antagonizes Blake's
"sayable" vision?
"A Golden String"
At the beginning of Chapter 4, "To the Christians," Blake gives the preliminary
aphoristic claim:
I give you the end of a golden string,
Only wind it into a ball:
It will lead you in at Heavens gate,
Built in Jerusalerns Wall. (Jerusalem 77)
In the illuminated print, the figure of a woman is seen holding the end of a string while walking
and looking up into a dark, cloudy sky, with the string leading her from the right hand side of the
page to the left, under the words quoted above; nowhere is there seen a ball wound out of the
string. Furthermore, the string slopes on an upward angle, separating the above passage from an
adjacent statement: "Devils are / False Religions / 'Saul Saul' / 'Why persecutest thou me." As
discussed above, many critics read into Jerusalem an archetypal pattern, and from this
perspective, the golden string represents the path through apocalypse to redemption, to Beulah,
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the unfallen state of reality, the totality of which, from the archetypal perspective, is represented
by the wound up golden ball. However, if Blake wished to emphasize the ball wound from the
string, then perhaps he might have included it in the illumination, which focuses on the string
and not the ball. Moreover, the winding of the string leads across into the comment about "False
Religions," which implies that to wind the string up into a ball is to fall prey to "False
Religions." Youngquist maintains that the golden string is akin to the particulars that make up
any context or general form, from the particulars of a life to those of a poem, whereas the ball
wound up is every individual's capacity to generalize and universalize that which is actually
composed out of particulars (609).
In addition, readings of this passage reveal the many ways of interpreting Jerusalem. In
Bloom's discussion, focus is given to the "False Religions" phrase, specifically in terms of Saul
and conversion, an approach which reinforces the perfect archetypal pattern of fallen man being
redeemed through apocalypse, although in this case Saul was blinded and given back his vision,
which serves as an apt metaphor for the fall and redemption of Blake's Albion (Bloom 462).
Thus, Bloom does not discuss the golden string side of the passage, instead emphasizing the
figure of Saul in relation to the overall pattern of Jerusalem.
In an alternative interpretation, Youngquist uses the golden string as an analogy for
reading Jerusalem through various critical perspectives. Primarily, he argues that the golden
string is Blake's own prescription for the way to read Jerusalem, "implied rules to govern the
game of reading" (606). Since the passage appears on Plate 77, Youngquist asserts it forces the
reader to reflect upon the activity of reading Jerusalem, "a position that complicates a process
already well under way" (606). Youngquist maintains that the golden string passage refers
directly to a field of particular possibilities and not a homogenizing, generalizing pattern: "A
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golden string is not an archetypal pattern, not even a special thread for weaving one. It is an
undetermined length of possible relations. The contract specifies less the formal coherence than
the discursive possibility of Jerusalem" (606). However, what does "discursive possibility" have
to do with Blake's Jerusalem? Is not a discursive possibility more akin to philosophy than
poetry?
For Youngquist, "discursive possibility" signals the variety of possible readings that can
be derived from Jerusalem, in place of taking a predefined archetype and forcing it upon the
interpretation. Youngquist asserts that Jerusalem cannot be read as one single story or narrative,
that it is neither a synchronic "event" nor a "diachronic" narrative, but ought to be read as an
open-ended piece, the interpretation of which is contingent upon a variety of factors ranging
from the understanding of Blake's intent as a creative poet to his historical, biographical context
and a variety of other critical considerations. The bottom line of Youngquist's argument is that
no single critical disposition is more accurate than another; instead,Jerusalem, because of its
wide array of characters, states of reality, states of being and so on, invites this myriad of critical
dispositions. As illustrated above in chapter one, criticism of Jerusalem ranges from
considerations of Einstein's physics to feminist arguments for and against a misogynistic reading
of Blake's presentation of women throughout his poetry and prose. With so many various types
of interests, styles, subject matters, mythologies and variations on a wide range of social,
political, religious, scientific, philosophical concerns, it is impossible to develop an archetypal
reading that comprehensively takes stock of every element of Blake's writing. The question
constantly emerges: "golden string" or ball? Opaque mystics or transparent vision? What, then,
does Blake declare with respect to his experience and its description through his art? The answer
53
is neither, that Blake's writing essentially displays characteristics of vision and mysticism and
that neither can be excluded in favor of the other .
There is an obvious tension within Blake's writing between espousing a clear vision of
eternity and acknowledging the damning impossibility of such an endeavor. In his general
disposition, Blake always maintains the necessary feasibility of communicating a transparent
vision, a vision free from an insidious ambiguity of expression that is then used for selfish,
immoral designs, such as the institutionalization of the Christian faith. In the opening quotation
to this chapter, Blake claims that the Bible is not allegory but "Eternal Vision or Imagination of
All that Exists," and that "Eternal Vision" must not be equivocally understood as "Fable or
Allegory." In the single engraved plate piece, "The Laocoon," Blake states:
The Eternal Body of Man is The Imagination
... It manifests itself in his [i.e. God's] works of Art (in Eternity All is Vision)
All that we See is Vision from Generated Organs gone as soon as come
Permanent in the Imagination. (273)
Here, vision is everything, from "Eternity" to physical reality, although in the corporeal world,
vision is to be found "Permanent in the Imagination," for after the body has died, its form lives
on in the imagination through vision. Blake also equates the "Eternal Body," with the
imagination, which is consequently demonstrated through creation, or God's "works of Art."
Elsewhere, Blake insists that vision, as the modality of all artwork, is a mode of perfection and
not ambiguity, 'The Man who asserts that there is no Such Thing as Softness in Art & that every
thing in Art is Definite & Determinate has not been told this by Practce but by Inspiration &
Vision because Vision is Determinate & Perfect & he Copies That without Fatigue Every thing
being Definite & determinate" (Annotations to The Works ofSir Joshua Reynolds 646). Thus,
54
vision for Blake is not to be confused with any figurative ambiguities "because Vision is
Determinate & Perfect" as well as "Definite," even though vision is paradoxically a vision of an
indefinite Eden.
However, Blake did not necessarily mean that eternity is definite or fixed, especially if
we read his words carefully. Consider the statement: "This World is a World ofImagination &
Vision I see Every thing I paint In This World, but Every body does not see alike" ("Letters"
702). This claim can mean that what Blake sees of the physical world is proof to him of divinity,
or it can mean that Blake actually witnesses eternity within the corporeal world in the forms of
spirits, saints and angels. According to Blake, it is the latter case:
I can alone carryon my visionary studies ... & that I may converse with my
friends in Eternity. See Visions, Dream Dreams, & prophecy & speak Parables
unobserv'd & at liberty from the Doubts of other Mortals. perhaps Doubts
proceeding from Kindness. but Doubts are always pernicious Especially when we
Doubt our Friends. ("Letters" 728)
In this description, we get another elaboration of Blake's visionary experience in terms of a
social phenomenon wherein Blake's proclaimed visions, as already mentioned, are not shared by
his contemporaries and Blake is subsequently deemed mad and deranged. Moreover, Blake had
come to realize that those around him did not respect his unique experience: "Blake learned a
bitter truth: no one cared anything about his visions. As an engraver, he had won a modest place
in the world ... as a poet, he heard some of his early lyrics still repeated; but as a visionary, as a
revealer of fundamental truths, he was adjudged at best eccentric, and at worst crazy" (Damon,
William Blake 154).
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Blake also claims that true vision is only fit for certain people: "What is Grand is
necessarily obscure to Weak men. That which can be made Explicit to the Idiot is not worth my
care" ("Letters" 702). However, who are weak men? Why is it that what "can be made Explicit
to the Idiot" is not "worth" Blake's time and "care"? This could be misconstrued for creating
class divisions between privileged and poor, between strong and weak, but if we take a closer
look at other references in Blake's writing, we see that conventional notions of weak and strong
are inverted in Blake's ideas. For Blake, idiocy is weakness either in terms of ignorance or an
intentional misuse of power. For example, Blake describes the misuse of scripture as resulting in
"the Divinity of Yes & No ... The Yea Nay Creeping Jesus" ("Letters" 783). Here, Blake
references his perspective on contraries, on dichotomies of "Yes & No" and "Yea Nay." In
Jerusalem, the following description of contraries is presented:
And this is the manner of the Sons of Albion in their strength
They take the Two Contraries which are calld Qualities, with which
Every Substance is clothed, they name them Good & Evil
From them they make an Abstract, which is a Negation
Not only of the Substance from which it is derived
A murderer of its own Body: But also a murderer
Of every Divine Member: it is the Reasoning Power
An Abstract objecting power, that Negatives every thing
This is the Spectre of Man: the Holy Reasoning Power
And in its Holiness is closed the Abomination of Desolation. (10.7-16)
56
The "Sons of Albion" are Blake's "Idiot]s]," who designate and manipulate contraries under the
direction of "the Holy Reasoning Power," which is therefore a complete misuse of intelligence
and power.
Thus, on the one hand Blake describes the strong overpowering the weak through th e
creation of contraries, whereas on the other Blake stipulates that the strong and predominan
upper classes are weak precisely because of their selfish misuse of knowledge, which Blak e
maintains is itself a form of idiocy. It is fitting, then, that the above passage is followed by the
declaration, "I must Create a System, or be enslav'd by another Mans." Blake elaborates on the
relation between negations and contraries: "Negations are not Contraries: Contraries mutually
Exist: / But Negations Exist Not: Exceptions & Objections & Unbeliefs / Exist Not: nor shall
they ever be Organized for ever & ever" (Jerusalem 17.33-35). Blake is evidently aware of the
discursive power of knowledge in terms of selfish motivations and hegemonic institutions.
Blake's recurrent example is the institutionalization of the church and Bible, the "Yes & No"
power to create and manipulate systems that revolve around dichotomies such as "Good & E v il."
However, the question remains as to what this all has to do with the present discussion ofB lake's
writing in terms of the mystical question.
The connection is relatively simple: if Blake is critical of the manipulation of knowledge
for selfish reasons, as the "Sons of Albion" do in Jerusalem, then he would have an equal
distaste for those experiences that allow for any ambiguity, such as an ineffable mystical
experience, from which assertions of knowledge and revelation are made, or a "Negation," .an
ambiguity that can be directed by those who would maintain power over others. By extensi-on,
then, Blake would designate mystical experience as "Weak," since it is not "Definite,"
"Determinate & Perfect." Blake perceives an inherently dangerous potential in ambiguity for the
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manipulation of the interpretation of that particular ambiguity, in this case in the form of
mystical experience. In a parallel criticism, Blake attacks Isaac Newton's physics and John
Locke's empirical philosophy for predefining and categorizing the experience of the world and
therefore for constricting our understanding of perception. A substantial part of Blake's criticism
rests on the scientific drive, as discussed by de Certeau, to predefine its own object in terms of its
own axiomatic precepts and from the perspective of a discursive domain only interested in its
own predefinitions, as psychoanalysis does by describing mystical experiences in terms of
predetermined pathologies and descriptions of mental illnesses and traumas. However, for all of
Blake's claims with respect to his "Determinate" and "Definite" vision, he also doubted whether
this vision could be imparted to others, and not in terms of "Weak" minds that cannot appreciate
such a vision, but because of the sheer audacity of taking an image of eternity, claiming it to be
authentic and artistically copying it down to share with others.
For example, in the first chapter of Jerusalem, "To the Public," Blake implores the
"Reader" to recognize Blake's humble disposition in the bold endeavor of presenting his vision:
"I am perhaps the most sinful of men! I pretend not to holiness! yet I pretend to love, to see, to
converse with daily, as man with man, & the more to have an interest in the Friend of Sinners.
Therefore [Dear] Reader [forgive]what you do not approve, & [love]me for this energetic
exertion of my talent" (Plate 3, italics Erdman's). In this passage, the narrator declares himself to
be potentially unfit for being the medium for the verse he is about to create. Northrop Frye,
Harold Bloom and other Blake critics identify Jerusalem as being composed of various
antitheses: "As a general principle of organization, a series of gradually sharpening antitheses
leading to a necessity for moral choice, this resembles the pattern of the major prophetic books
of the Bible. Blake calls himself 'a true Orator' in the preface to Chapter I, and true orators are
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preciselY" what the Hebrew prophets attempted to be" (Bloom 405). Notwithstanding brief
criticisms of narrative structure and consistency, Bloom describes Jerusalem as "a very orderly
poem, much more so than the comments of many of Blake's critics would lead us to expect"
(404). With respect to the preface, Bloom focuses on the narrator's comments of creating a
"more consolidated & extended Work," and overlooks the qualification that the narrator may not
be fit fo r recreating the vision through the artistic medium, and the plea with the public to "~ove]
me for tbis energetic exertion of my talent."
T o paraphrase in terms of de Certeau 's analysis of mystics, does Blake find a "sayable," a
vision tlsat can be coherently imparted to all individuals? Is this Blake's ultimate goal or is it
even possible to sift through Blake's seemingly contradictory thought process, which in the one
instance declares that "All deities reside in the human breast" (Marriage ofHeaven and Hell
Plate 11) , while in another, maintains, "What is Grand is necessarily obscure to Weak men?" In
this case::,Blake apparently contradicts himselfby claiming on the one hand that the experience
of eterni.ty is available to everyone, while on the other asserting that the vision of eternity is not
meant for "Weak" persons. This duality might be further read as implying the practical and
social cbaracteristic of Blake's writing and ideas, which is therefore closely linked with Blake's
own obsservations of mysticism. The description of weakness here is a weakness in terms of
humanity's potential for selfish and greedy behavior, selfishness and greed instead of what
Bloom describes as "a necessity for moral choice," and this weakness is what causes individuals
to intenttionally ignore the dictates of conventional morality for selfish designs. Religious
authorit:y that exerts its power through discursive recourse to scriptural interpretation can be
founded! on ineffable, mystical experiences that are subsequently manipulated and tailored to the
design Ollf religious institutions more interested in perpetuating power and control than spiritual
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enlightenment and fulfillment. Blake distrus s mystical declarations that leave room for
ambiguous, opaque interpretations. However-, based on Blake's comments in the opening plates
of Jerusalem, where he begs the "Reader" to recognize the inherent futility of transmitting a
divine vision of such "Determinate" and "Pe feet" clarity, we may note that perhaps Blake
understood too well the nature of prophetic VVork,both a gift and a damnation, to converse with
spirits and eternity; but to do so alone, reject~d to the point of wanting to be alone, "from the
Doubts of other Mortals." Dominic Rainsforej describes Blake's plea with the "Reader" in similar
terms of the shortcomings of the visionary's endeavor "as an independently fallible mortal who
may have taken on more than he can manage" (92-93).
Blake uses the word vision throughout his writing to describe an experience of eternity
that does not leave room for equivocation, and at certain points to give his preferred description
for his artistic aim. However, Blake does not therefore use the word mystical to delineate the
opposite of his visionary experience, but simply uses the adjective as a descriptive word in his
poetry. Thus, in a canceled plate from Blake>s poem, America: A Prophecy, the description
"mystic ornaments" appears to give an ethereal tone to the passage (Plate b), and in chapter three
of Jerusalem Blake describes "The Mystic Union" of the "Emanation" to "Man" (53.24). In
Blake's cosmology, the Emanation is the Female counterpart to a whole that is fragmented in the
fallen world and is unified in eternity. When the fall occurs, the Female counterpart separates
(emanates) from the male and is often called the emanation. In this passage, Blake uses the word
"Mystic" to give a similar, ethereal connotation. Nowhere does Blake give a detailed account for
or against mysticism, most likely owing to What de Certeau and others describe as the transition
from the adjective mystical to the commonly known term, mysticism . Whether or not Blake
identified the opposite of vision with the word mystic, his verse is engaged in the common
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domain shared by both mystical and visionary experience. At this point in time, mysticism has
predominantly crossed into the segregated, predetermined field for a particular sort of experience
as opposed to an adjective potentially applied to any experience. In our current understanding,
mysticism is a field of experience cut off from and opposite to the status quo of observable
perception, particularly in being an ineffable, "unsayable," event.
In this chapter, I have analyzed an array of different descriptions and definitions of both
mystical and visionary experience, from Blake scholars to religious and theological theorists.
Throughout the course of this discussion, it becomes evident that most of these descriptions
demarcate a duality between mysticism and vision. With respect to Blake's writing and ideas,
what can be said of these experiences and their relation? As mentioned above, Blake has a
fundamental suspicion of those descriptions of knowledge and experience that invite ambiguity
or a malleability of open interpretation. However, Blake also states "Every body does not see
alike," which can mean either that there are a multitude of perspectives and dispositions of
visionary experience and experience in general, or that there is only one unflinching, "Perfect,"
"Determinate" and "Definite" vision of eternity, to which Blake is specifically privy and which
he subsequently transmits through his illuminated verse.
From a different angle, is there an "unsayable," ineffable characteristic latent to the
surface vision? Either way, it does not seem logical to assert that the same author who claims he
must create a system to avoid being "enslav'd" to another would then claim that his vision is
more correct and accurate than another individual's perception or experience of divinity. Thus, I
interpret Blake's comments as indicating the open-ended potential for knowledge, imagination
and diversity of perception rather than shackling possibility. In other words, Blake admires the
human potential for imaginative diversity, but detests the use of this imaginative potential for
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selfish and greedy reasons . In the final chapter, I engage with the following potentiality: that
Blake detests interpretations of eternity that allow for the subsequent misuse and
institutionalization of those same interpretations, and that this is the reason critics have derived
an inherent critique of mysticism within Blake's poetry and prose. However, this does not
necessitate the conclusion that Blake detests the genuine mystical experience. In other words,
Blake would not condemn those who strive to communicate their mystical experiences, though
he must present the fallen world first before revealing his vision of eternity. The narrator's
comments in the opening preface of chapter one in Jerusalem serve as an apology for the
necessary darkness of his vision, "I am perhaps the most sinful of men! I pretend not to
holiness!" Blake may be indicating here that he is sinful in criticizing the Christian church (and
all religions) from within through his presentation of an apocalyptic world in his poetry. In other
words, since he is predominantly engaged in representing the antithesis to "holiness," he does not
concentrate directly and positively on eternity, but indirectly through divinity's negative.
Chapter 3: "0 all-powerful Human Words!"
"To see a World in a Grain of Smd
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower
Hold Infin ity in the palm of your hand
And Etern ity in an hour" (Blake , "Auguries of Innocence 1-4).
Jerusalem is far too vast and intricate ~ poem to expound comprehensively all of its
characteristics here, even if! were to dedicate the whole of the present thesis to its explication.
Instead, I rigorously discuss certain passages from a number of critical perspectives, focusing on
the debate over a mystical or a visionary expression found in the epic poem. As stated earlier, a
critical consensus has developed from Northrop Frye's significant work Fearful Symmetry,
David V. Erdman's Blake: Prophet Against Empire and Harold Bloom's Blake's Apocalypse,
which all focus on Blake's emphasis on a visionary and not mystical description of eternity. With
this in mind, this chapter discusses Jerusalem in terms of the debate over whether Blake is a
visionary or a mystic. In the previous chapter, I illustrate the complex nature of the relation
between vision and mysticism, and the range of possible definitions, culminating in de Certeau's
mystics. De Certeau draws attention to the shift in the acceptance of what constitutes mysticism
and how it differs from supposedly objective modes of experiencing divinity, such as vision.
Throughout the present chapter, I address specific contemporary readings of Blake's writing that
are similar to de Certeau 's notion of mystics and his subsequent explanation of how scientific
discourse predefines mysticism according to scientific axioms. With this in mind, I begin with
the conclusion of Jerusalem since it is here that Blake delivers one of his most elaborate
depictions of a vision of eternity, in addition to being the target of many Blake interpretations.
The second passage discussed, taken from Plate 45, draws out a comparison between Blake's
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Albion and de Certeau's discussion of the body. The third excerpt, taken from Plates 30 and 31,
demonstrates the understanding Blake has of the importance of perception in relation to
knowledge and power, particularly in terms of the power to manipulate individuals through the
manipulation of knowledge. Similarly, de Certeau describes the power of scientific discourse to
manipulate the definition of mysticism. Plate 54 gives a summary account of Albion's fall as
well as a description of Blake's criticism of the manipulative power of knowledge and discourse.
Finally, Plate 91 yields insight into Blake's concern with the relation between perception,
knowledge and control, a relation that helps in illustrating Blake's dislike of describing his vision
as mystical or ineffable. It is exactly the degree of Blake's visionary achievement that Miller
questions in his reading of Blake.
With respect to archetypal analysis reaching a critical consensus, Dan Miller asserts, "the
Blake we now have is the prophet of eternal vision and transcendent imagination" (155). Miller
cites the description of vision, quoted above, found in Blake's A Vision ofthe Last Judgment, in
which Blake criticizes "Fable or Allegory" in favor of "Vision or Imagination." However, Miller
asserts that he is not engaged in complementing the predominant critical consensus, but is
interested in interrogating Blake's verse with respect to its visionary status. Miller does not
phrase his criticism in terms of mysticism and vision, but instead focuses on "what the concept
of vision includes, what it denies, how it operates within Blake's argument, and what principles
govern the distinction between vision and allegory" (156). Miller claims that many critics agree
with Blake's criticism of allegory and his preference for vision, although Miller argues that
Blake's visionary poetic form is not as consistent in its endeavor as the archetypal analysis
maintains. Miller uses the term "allegory" to describe what he calls the "disruption" of Blake's
vision of eternity: "It marks the place of all that vision seeks to transcend but cannot leave
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behind - the inevitability of some mode of representation within al perception, the figural
component of the imagination. Allegory, therefore, can serve to suggest that moment when the
argument [on vision] ... reaches its limits and finds the distinctions untenable" (162). In other
words, Miller maintains that Blake's poetic aim to avoid the equivocatory nature of "Fable or
Allegory" through the agenda of a visionary is implicitly doomed f rom the outset, much in the
same way that de Certeau describes his own study of mystics, by the inability of language to
perform the task that Blake sets out to accomplish.
I begin with the conclusion of Jerusalem, Plate 98, as this marks, according to many
Blakean critics, a monumental argument on Blake's behalf for a visionary experience of divinity:
The Four Living Creatures Chariots of Humanity D ivine
Incomprehensible
In beautiful Paradises expand These are the Four Rivers of Paradise
And the Four Faces of Humanity fronting the Four Cardinal Points
Of Heaven going forward f orward irresistible from Eternity to Eternity
And they conversed together in Visionary forms dramatic which bright
Redounded from their Tongues in thunderous majesty, in Visions
In new Expanses, creating exemplars of Memory and of Intellect
Creating Space, Creating T ime according to the wonders Divine
Of Human Imagination, throughout all the Three Regions immense
Of Childhood, Manhood & Old Age [;] & the all tremendous
unfathomable Non Ens
Of Death was seen in regenerations terrific or complacent varying
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According to the subject of discourse & every Word & Every Character
Was Human according to the Expansion or Contraction, the
Translucence or
Opakeness of Nervous fibres such was the variation of Time & Space
Which vary according as the Organs of Perception vary & they walked
To & fro in Eternity as One Man reflecting each in each & clearly seen
And seeing : according to fitness & order. And I heard Jehovah speak
Terrific from his Holy Place & saw the Words of the Mutual
Covenant Divine
On Chariots of gold & jewels with Living Creatures starry & flaming
With every Colour, Lion, Tyger, Horse, Elephant, Eagle Dove, Fly,
Worm,
And the all wondrous Serpent clothed in gems & rich array Humanize
In the Forgiveness of Sins according to the Covenant of Jehovah.
(98.24-45).
In the conclusion of Jerusalem, Albion awakens and rejoins with his emanation, Jerusalem, and
thus the fallen state of the world is healed. The veil of death and generation, the world of organic
decay, is tom away, through apocalypse, to reveal divinity "clearly seen / And seeing." Here,
ambiguity, "Fable or Allegory," is overcome by "Visionary forms dramatic" and "the wonders
Divine / Of Human Imagination."
To date, most readings of Jerusalem make reference to Plate 98, whether as a coup de
grace of Blake's visionary endeavor, or as a part ofa critique of Blake's success in producing
through poetry a "Perfect" vision of "Eternity." Damon reads this passage as the last stage of the
66
mystic's development, a union with God, having come through the dark night of the soul and
emerging into the light of divinity. White gives similar praise to Plate 98, although for different
reasons:
As to the achievement of the life of vision on universal lines probably the best
picture Blake draws of it . .. is to be found in the brilliant paean of joy that closes
Jerusalem .. . Such is the consummation of Blake's philosophy of the creative
imagination. It is not the union with the ineffable in the spirit of the solitary
worshiper ... It is a social redemption, an intercourse of the awakened in visions
of eternity. That is the clearest and most express account Blake ever vouchsafed
of the great regeneration. (205-206)
In a certain light, White's analysis bridges the critical gap between Damon's mystical
interpretation and Frye's archetypal analysis in that White engages in the mystical question but
does not agree that there is a predominant mystical characteristic to be found in Blake's poetry
and prose, but instead criticizes such a reading in favor of Blake's own self-proclaimed visionary
writing. White maintains that, as a mystic, Blake falls short of the traditional description since
Blake's writing "is not the union with the ineffable in the spirit of the solitary worshipper."
Erdman also reads Plate 98 and the conclusion of Jerusalem as the epic's climactic emergence
through apocalypse.
For Erdman , Plate 98 is the completion of Blake's visionary world, giving a visual
glimpse into the author's own divine imagination: "Without Good and Evil will the new
Jerusalem be a tame society? Far from it. This may be 'incomprehensible by Mortal Man,' but
there will be 'A Sun of blood red wrath ... Glorious' and occupying no mere spot in the sky but
'surrounding heaven, on all sides around.' And under the illumination of this furious sky, man
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with man will converse together ... In William Blake's paradise the intellectual lions and lambs
will not exactly lie down together but will roar and bleat at each other in an energetic
comradeship ranging over all topics which the Human Imagination can conceive" (486). Erdman
notes the apocalyptic undertone of Plate 98, but interprets its presence as the energy of
"intellectual" "comradeship," which takes the form of the "Human Imagination" and is therefore
a necessary ingredient in the convalescence of the fallen world . Bloom describes an analogous
build up to a perfect "vision of contraries prepared for the mental wars of the restored state"
(479) .
In Bloom's discussion, the climactic Plate 98 signals a perfection of the visionary
archetype which Blake strives to communicate through his writing:
Word and vision are one here, with the image evident immediately it is uttered.
The mind so directly creating space and time, regenerates even the nonexistence
of death, inventing it or destroying it at will. In the presence of a Word altogether
humanized, the forms of individuals accomplish that last paradox of being,
according to desire , One Man, the perfect freedom of humanistic communion, of
dialogue and mutual vision. (480)
Bloom and Erdman maintain that Jerusalemsuccessfully concludes with a poetic vision of
Blake 's fallen world redeemed through apocalypse and ready to engage in "mental wars," all
made possible by the divine or "Human" imagination. As with their general discussion of
Blake's writing, Bloom and Erdman, preceded by White , leave no room for an interpretation of
mystic ism, but emphasize the success of Blake's self-proclaimed visionary endeavor in the
concluding plates of his last epic poem . However, this critical consensus is challenged in more
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recent readings ofJerusalem, as illustrated in the discussions of Plate 98 offered by Rainsford,
Rothenberg and Miller.
For Rainsford, the conclusion of Jerusalem is not a testament to visionary perfection,
"Determinate" and "Definite," but instead it acts as a quick fix to the fallen state of the world:
"All in all, the closing pages of Jerusalem involve a tremendous tying up of loose ends. Through
the implied Blake who narrates the poem, or through Los, or through Albion, Blake suppresses
his contraries, incorporates his Emanation, subdues his Spectre ... and engages generally in an
allegory of self-perfecting. The violence which Blake had addressed and in which he had
vigorously participated, earlier in the poem, is not resolved but comes to be avoided" (91).
Rainsford argues that the conclusion contains a latent problem of betraying its own hypocrisy in
not adequately dealing with the state of crisis in the fallen world, "to be avoided" by appeals to
visions of eternity. Ina parallel criticism, Rothenberg claims that perhaps Blake's intent as an
author is contradicted by his own artistic creation: "The possibility that language will escape the
intention of its a uthor, that the text will free itselffrom its supposed referent, thatthe poem
works to sever itself from a determinate context" (49). This notion of predetermining an
interpretation ofa literary work is discussed above with respect to Blake's writing, an occurrence
that also predefines Blake's categorization as a visionary poet and not a mystic. However, here
Rothenberg challenges not only critics' predetermining interpretations, but also the intent of
Blake himself as the author of Jerusalem who, as Rainsford states, "may have taken on more
than he can manage" (92-93).
Miller argues that in this climactic sequence there should be found the culmination of
Blake's vision: "If we hope to find the imaginative image in its purest, most transcendent form, it
should be here, when the nightmare of history has come to a close and the false garment of
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nature has fallen away to reveal the true image of humanity and the human world. An apocalypse
of vision, a revelation of eternal images, an imaging of the imagi nation itself' (162). As with
Rainsford and Rothenberg, Miller asserts that Blake's vision is inherently infected with what it
seeks to transcend: "While the imagination seeks to overcome th e differences and distinctions of
fallen perception, a system of oppositions still governs Blake's discourse" (165). Examples of
Miller's claim that "a system of oppositions still governs Blake' s discourse" can be found on
Plate 98, where Blake references elements of the fallen world, after the awakening of Albion:
Circumscribing & Circumcising the
excremetitious
Husk & Covering into Vacuum evaporating the lineaments of
Man
Driving outward the Body of Death in an Eternal Death & Resurrection
Where is the Covenant of Priam, the Moral Virtues of the Heathen
Where is the Tree of Good & Evil that rooted beneath the cruel heel
Of Albions Spectre the Patriarch Druid! where all his Human
Sacrifices
For Sin in War & in the Druid Temples of the Ac cuser of Sin: beneath
The Oak Groves of Albion that coverd the whole Earth beneath his
Spectre
Where are the Kingdoms of the World & all their glory that grew on
Desolation
The Fruit of Albion's Poverty Tree when the Triple Headed
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Gog-Magog Gi ant
Of Albion Taxed the Nations into Desolation & then gave the Spectrous
Oath
Such is the Cry from a 1 the Earth from the Living Creatures of the
Earth (98.18-20 , 46-54).
Here, its former inhabitants, who question what has happened since Albion has awoken, seem to
pine for the fallen world in its startling absence. For Miller, the parts that describe the fallen
condition reveal the narrator's dependency upon "a system of oppositions" as well as showing
that in divinity the fallen world still remains as an idea and in the imagination.
Miller reads Plate 98 in terms o f a tension between an archetypal, idyllic vision of
divinity and the language that represents this vision. Miller appeals to a mysticism when he
implies that Blake's language inevitably confounds the vision of divinity it seeks to describe.
Since Miller claims that if Blake's language fails to express that which cannot be said in words,
de Certeau's "unsayable," then he is inadvertently stating that Blake's poetic aim is the ineffable.
However, Blake labored to create a vision free from the ineffable, one that illustrates the
deception of knowledge through power and manipulation.
Blake, like the mystics de Certeau describes, clearly sees the illness within religion,
politics and society in general, but is hard pressed to effectively heal the problem, much in the
same way that Los struggles with the f a ll of Albion. De Certeau discusses the discursive aspect
of mystics : "mysticism is less a heresy or a liberation from religion than an instrunent for the
work of unveiling, within religion itself, a truth that would first be formulated in the mode ofa
margin inexpressible in relation to orthodox texts and institutions, and which would then be able
to be exhumed from beliefs" ("Mysticism" 24). Blake similarly works with the Christian and
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Biblical s ymbolic domains to unveil their corruptions and misrepresentations at the hands of
authority , This passage is comparable to Bloom's description of Plate 98 in terms of divine
"mental vvars ," since de Certeau discusses a healthy antagonism with orthodox religion, although
de Certea.u's mystics takes place in the corporeal world whereas the "mental wars" of Blake's
vision take place between Divine Imaginations, reconciled from the fallen world. Moreover, de
Certeau imlplies a politics here when he states that knowledge derived from mystical experience
is necessarily born on the margins of orthodox religion. Blake distrusts ambiguous or ineffable
experiences that either remain on the margins of a conventional norm, as Blake's own poetry did
during h i s life time, or become utilized by orthodox "institutions." In chapter 3 ofJerusalem, the
narrator a sks , "Are not Religion & Politics the Same Thing? Brotherhood is Religion / 0
Demons t rations of Reason Dividing Families in Cruelty & Pride" (57.10-11). Blake also equates
science, r"Reason," with "Religion & Politics," all of which have the same institutionalizing,
"Dividing... Cruelty & Pride." Furthermore, Blake identifies an institutionalized problem that
causes re jpression even within the literary tradition in terms of the style he uses to write
Jerusale rn.
In the opening preface to chapter one of Jerusalem, Blake comments:
When this verse was first dictated to me I consider'd a Monotonous Cadence like
that used by Milton & Shakespeare & all writers of English Blank Verse, derived
from the modem language of Rhyming; to be a necessary and indispensable part
of Verse. But I soon found that in the mouth ofa true Orator such monotony was
not only awkward, but as much a bondage as rhyme itself. I therefore have
produced variety in every line, both of cadences & number of syllables ... Poetry
Fetter'd, Fetters the Human Race. (Plate 4)
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Even Blake's languajge must be free from the "Fetters [of] the Human Race," "Fetters" that
threaten to control e ery aspect of an individual's life. Similarly, de Certeau's mystics leave the
"Fetters" of orthodo religion behind in their pursuit of eternity. Frye claims that Blake's
insistence on emanc i pation, summarized in the statement "I must Create a System or be enslav'd
by another Mans," s ould be understood "in its context, not identifying the 'I' with Blake, but
seeing it as defining necessary activity of the poetic process. One should never think of Blake
as operating or mani jjpulating a 'system' of thought, nor should we be misled by his architectural
metaphors to think o-rf his symbolic language as something solidified and crustacean" (Fearful
Symmetry "Preface" . However, how can the language that supposedly describes a "Definite"
and "Determinate" v-;ision of divinity not be "solidified?" Is it not a contradiction endorse the
"Definite" vision on the one hand and claim that the language, as the vehicle of representing the
vision, cannot struct rally fit the vision itself on the other?
I offer a brietff expository experiment, before launching into the reading of Plate 45. I take
some inspiration fro Rothenberg's critical stance in not referencing previous Blake scholarship
on names, characters, and Blake's mythic world in general: "I regard virtually all of the
commentary on Bla e's work as exercises in fixing a fundamentally indeterminate text. I do not
interpret. .. Blake's text by reference to any of the scholarship that tries to create a symbol key"
(70n3). I do not corrrupletely agree with Rothenberg's critical nihilism in omitting a whole corpus
of Blake criticism, though I initially copy her critical design, followed by other potential
perspectives and re «lings of Plate 45.
In terms oftbe basic plot, if such a description can be applied to any part of Jerusalem,
Plate 45 takes us int I() Los' journey through Albion's body:
Fearir g that Albion should turn his back against the Divine Vision
Los took his globe of fire to search the interiors of Albions
Bosom, in all the terrors of friendship, entering the caves
Of despair & death, to search the tempters out, walking among
Albions rocks & precipices! caves of solitude & dark despair,
And saw every Minute Particular of Albion degraded & murderd
But saw not by whom; they were hidden within in the minute
Particulars
Of which they had possessd themselves; and there they take up
The articulations of a mans soul, and laughing throw it down
Into the frame, then knock it out upon the plank, & souls are bak'd
In bricks to build the pyramids of Hebar & Terah. But Los
Searched in vain: closd from the minutia he walkd, difficult.
He came down from thro Hackney & Holloway towards
London
Till he came to old Stratford & thence to Stepney & the Isle
Of Leuthas Dogs, thence thro the narrows of the Rivers side
And saw every minute particular, the jewels of Albion, running down
The kennels of the streets & lanes as if they were abhorrd.
Every Universal Form, was become barren mountains of Moral
Virtue: and every Minute Particular hardend into grains of sand:
And all the tendemesses of the soul cast forth as filth and mire.
(45.2-21).
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At this point in Jerusalem, we already know t.hat the state of the fallen world is somehow
connected with the figure of Albion and his cjircumstances because he erroneously ignored "the
Divine Vision," which is variously described in terms of Albion's sleep, death and other states of
unconsciousness.
When the character Los somehow en hers "Alb ions Bosom," there is an immediate
suggestion of a radical physical relation wher by either Los is a miniature creature or Albion is
some sort of giant. There are "caves" and "rocks & precipices" within Albion, as well as place
names such as London, which hints at an exp anation of Albion as the personified figuration of
either England or the world. While searching through Albion's body, Los discovers that some
unseen enemy has "degraded & murdered" "every Minute Particular of Albion." Furthermore,
the minute particulars are taken and utilized for the oppression of "mans soul." Los sees that
from "Universal Form" to "minute Particular .." every part of Albion is corrupted from the present
crisis. There is nothing here to suggest perfec tion of vision, nor an ineffable mystical experience.
Los bears witness to the devastation and aftermath after Albion turned "his back against the
Divine Vision," which also means that Albion intentionally turns his back on eternity and is
consequently responsible for being the catalyst of the state of his fallen body.
Bloom claims that the verse on Plate 45 is some of Blake's best poetry, and interprets
Los' journey through Albion's "inner abyss o f the mortal self," as a search for the "alien
invaders within man," only to find that "the irreducible individualities that make up a human, are
murdered within man by the hidden Accusers" (Bloom 441-442). Bloom describes Blake's
comments about "Universal Form" as an attack on generalizing practices, whereas Blake favors
"only one Universal Form: the Human Form Divine, man as he was and as he might be" (443).
However, there is a significant roadblock in the way - "the hidden Accusers," who have laid
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waste to Albion's minute particulars. In other words, as stated above, the vision of eternity is
implicitly contradicted by the fallen world, even in idea and imagination.
From another angle, de Certeau discusses the importance of the body to mystics and their
experience:
What is the body? Mystic discourse is obsessed by this question. What it
focuses on is precisely the question of the body. It haunts the suburbs of
the body, and if it enters, it is in the manner of the Hebrews who once
marched around Jericho with their trumpets until the city opened of its
own accord. The body had not yet been colonized by medicine or
mechanics. As a hypothetical model, that enigmatic focal point may be
represented by a center, constructed from three points that shift according
to variations in their interrelationships. These points represent: ( I) an
event pole (the surprise of pain, pleasure, or perceptions, which institutes a
temporality); (2) a symbol pole (of discourse, stories, or signs, which
organize meaning or truths); and (3) a social pole (a network of
communications .. .that institute a 'being there' or an 'inhabiting')."
(Mystic Fable 80)
One initial difference here is that de Certeau refers to the sixteenth and seventeenth century
whereas Blake wrote at the end of the eighteenth, beginning of the nineteenth century. By
Blake's time the body had started to become "colonized by medicine or mechanics," which
means that individuals were determined by institutions and definitions that manipulate and the
body, in much the same way that religious institutions manipulate the spirit, as Blake often
describes in his writing. Plate 45 is an excellent description of de Certeau's hypothetical model.
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The model is essentially a representation of the body in the form a triangle. Each focal point, or
pole, is a line on the triangle, so as to stress the fundamental relation between each pole. De
Certeau does not clarify whether the body is the physical or spiritual (soul), but in its mystical
aspect the body is this relation between the event, the symbol of that event, and its
communication or responsibility to the community. If Albion is the body, then the pain and lack
of perception is the event, the symbol or model of meaning is Blake's verse and mythic world,
and the communication is actually a series of communications between characters within the
pages of Jerusalem. Or, the communication is through the medium of Blake's verse in terms of
an availability of the poem for all to read. One of Blake's central concerns is with the relation
between knowledge, perception and the manipulation of individuals.
Blake discusses perception as the mode of the reception of knowledge, and the
malleability of perception according to different modes of understanding and observation, as
described in the following passage from chapter two:
Reuben slept in Bashan like one dead in the valley
Cut off from Albions mountains & from all the Earths summits
Between Succouth & Zaretan beside the Stone of Bohan
While the Daughters of Albion divided Luvah into three Bodies
Los bended his Nostrils down to the Earth, then sent him over
Jordan to the Land of the Hittite: every one that saw him
Fled! they fled at his horrible Form: they hid in caves
And dens, they looked at one another & became what they beheld
Reuben return'd to Bashan, in despair he slept on the Stone.
Then Gwendolen divided into Rahab and Tirzah in Twelve Portions [.]
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Los rolled, his Eyes into two narrow circles, then sent him
Over Jordan; all terrified fled: they became what they beheld.
(Jerusalem 30.43-54)
Reuben is one of Los' sons, who in this passage is being awoken by Los, possibly to help in
waking Albion. However, Los fails and Reuben constantly returns to "Bashan," only to go to
back to sleep. In the meantime, Reuben apparently scares away people, who "became what they
beheld," a phrase Blake uses more than once. The phrase, "they looked at one another & became
what they beheld" can be read as a comment on the force and vivacity of perception since it is
strong enough to influence someone into becoming what they perceive, or "beheld." De
Certeau's notion of scientific definition ofmysticisrn in terms of scientific axioms also points to
the manipulative power of the perception of eternity as classified by scientific discourse. In the
present discussion, we see how definitions of mysticism and vision shape our understanding and
reception of Blake's writing.
In the remainder of Plate 30 and the beginning of Plate 31, Blake addresses perception
more directly:
If Perceptive Organs vary, Objects of Perception seem to vary:
If the Perceptive Organs close: their Objects seem to close also:
Consider this 0 mortal Man! 0 worm of sixty winters said Los
Consider Sexual Organization & hide thee in the dust.
Then the Divine hand found the Two Limits, Satan and Adam,
In Albions bosom: for in every Human bosom those Limits stand.
And the Divine voice came from the Furnaces, as multitudes without
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Number! the voices of the innumerable multitudes of Eternity .
And the appearance of a Man was seen in the furnaces;
Saving those who have sinned from the punishment of the Law
.. . No individual can keep these Laws , for they are death
To every energy of man, and forbid the springs of life.
(30.55-58,31.1-6,11-12)
Perception is the key to this passage, in that it makes individuals become what they observe
owing to its malleable nature to alter the "Objects" that are seen. Thus, in opposition to
individuals becoming what they perceive, perception can also alter the reception of the "Objects"
observed. An example may be seen in the comparison ofa blind person's and a deaf person's
reception and perception of the world. However , Blake is not just discussing physical objects,
but also objects of the mind, or ideas such as one's perception of an idea, like the mathematical
equation one plus one equals two. The 'Two Limits, Satan and Adam" are Biblical perceptions
of the two moral extremes good and evil, ideas that reside in "Albions bosom," and within all
humanity, the possibility of contraries that emerge in the fallen state in the same way that the
female emanation separates from the male in the fallen world. Furthermore, the "Law" hinders
the individual's energy through repression and the institutionalization of knowledge, which can
only take place through the divisive, mechanistic oppression of the individual through authority,
an authority that can be derived from ambiguous sources and claims, such as scripture, mystical
experience and the interpretation of both. In terms of whether Blake is a mystic or a visionary,
we see once again that it is the danger of open-ended ambiguous interpretation that leads to the
possibility of manipulating individuals through the control of institutions. The next passage,
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taken from Plate 54, demonstrates Blake's understanding of knowledge and the manipulation of
power.
The following passage also serves as a good example of Blake's cosmology:
In Great Eternity, every particular Form gives forth or Emanates
Its own peculiar Light, & the Form is the Div ine Vision
And the Light is his Garment This is Jerusalem in every Man
A Tent & Tabernacle of Mutual Forgiveness M ale & Female Clothings.
And Jerusalem is called Liberty among the C hildren of Albion
But Albion fell down a Rocky fragment from Eternity hurld
By his own Spectre, who is the Reasoning Power in every Man
Into his own Chaos which is the Memory between Man & Man
The silent broodings of deadly revenge sprin ging from the
All powerful parental affection, fills Albion f rom head to foot
Seeing his Sons assimilate with Luvah, boun-d in the bonds
Of spiritual Hate, from which springs Sexual Love as iron chains:
He tosses like a cloud outstretchd among Jervsalems Ruins
Which overspread all the Earth, he groans among his mind porches.
(54.1-14)
In eternity "Male & Female" are one in each other, "Jerusalem in every Man," in a perfect
harmony of "Mutual Forgiveness." However, this all chang ed after the fall, when Albion is
described as a rock cast out of eternity by his "own Spectre , " In the fallen world, "Memory" is in
total chaos in a tension "between Man & Man," owing to conflict and struggle over power and
control. Albion bears witness to the fallen state of himself, -a:he world, but is polluted by the same
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struggle for power, particularly in an authorit tive position of "All powerful parental affection,"
which parallels positions of institutions in mainipulating individuals, although Albion is here
described in a position of influence but does m ot ac tually exert that power.
Tossing "among Jerusalems Ruins." Ibion observes the twisted developments of the
fallen world in the remainder of Plate 54, as ~escribed by his "spectre":
But the Spectre like a hoar frost & a mildew rose over Albion
Saying, I am God 0 Sons of en! I am your Rational Power!
Am I not Bacon & Newton & Locke who teach Humility to Man!
Who teach Doubt & Experimeent & my two Wings Voltaire: Rousseau.
Where is that Friend to Sinner:s! that Rebel against my Laws!
Who teaches Belief to the Natiions, & an unknown Eternal Life
Come hither into the Desart Sc: tum these stones to bread.
Vain foolish Man! wilt thou believe without Experiment?
And build a World of Phantas jy upon my Great Abyss!
A World of Shapes in craving ; lust & devouring appetite (54.15-24).
Albion's spectredescribes the problem of ra sn unknown Eternal Life" that is not observable and
should therefore not be believed or trusted. Imsteacl, the spectre implies that the only God is
observable through "Experiment," and thereffore declares itself God since it, the spectre, is the
"Rational Power" of every individual. Here, we get a direct criticism of the mystical ineffable
experience within Blake's poetry, "A World of Shapes in craving lust & devouring appetite." I
qualify this criticism by stating that althoughn Blake denies the individual ineffable experience,
the object or aim of visionary experience is~et the same as the mystical in being in the presence
of and experiencing divinity or eternity. In oether words, Blake does not necessarily deny the
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genuine mystical experience; instead he denies the ascription and mani ulation of experience
and knowledge that leads to the institutionalization lidcontrol of know-. edge itself. We must
also not forget Blake's qualification that everyone prceives differently. or has a different and
unique perspective and disposition that cannot be hanogenized through the "Rational Power"
that Blake calls the spectre.
However, if Blake here criticizes the "RatjoralPower" for bein oppressive and divisive
through appeal to "Experiment," then the same cr-itidsm can be leveled .at Blake's argument here
since his vision itself appeals to "Doubt & Experi.mnt'' by claiming th azt a vision of eternity must
be "Definite" and "Perfect," therefore doubting the xistence of divini and demanding proof in
a "Determinate" form. Blake certainly felt the awes mepower and resp nsibility of dealing in
prophecy and vision, especially in copying it dovvn hroughpoetic foITIL., as is evident through his
constant and consistent insistence on a coherent, c leuand distinct visio of an eternity free from
an intentional and immora use of ambiguity and th powerof knowledgge. It takes one hundred
engraved illuminated plates of apocalypse and str-ugle within Blake's r::nythic and prophetic epic
poem, Jerusalem, before reaching this eternity fre-edfrom the shackles c:::>f"Doubt&
Experiment."
Toward the conclusion of Jerusalem, on P lae91, Los addresses and criticizes those
individuals who keep Albion asleep and also keep 31people manipulated through deceit and an
inappropriate use of knowledge and power:
so he who wishes to see a 'Vsion; a perfect Who.e
Must see it in its Minute Particulars:Organized & not <:as thou
o Fiend of Righteousness pretencfes; thine is a Disorgaenized
And snowy cloud: brooder of tempests & destructive W'car
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You ~mi le with pomp & rigor: you talk of benevolence & virtue!
I act with benevolence & virtue & get murderd time after time:
You accumulate Particulars, & murder by analyzing, that you
May take the aggregate; & you call the aggregate Moral Law:
And you call that Swelld and bloated Form; a Minute Particular .
But £J eneral Forms have their vitality in Particulars: & every
Particular is a Man
... rhe Spectre builded stupendous Works, taking the starry Heavens
Likee to a curtain & folding them according to his will
.. . GOS reads the stars of Albion! the Spectre reads the Voids
bet~een the Stars. (91.20-37)
Los describes the" Fiend of Righteousness" as taking "Particulars" and transforming them,
"murder[ing] by a~alyzing," and then collecting the data and writing it down into what he calls
"Moral Law." A "IWlinute Particular" that is taken, analyzed and then predefined according to a
certain preconceiveed idea can be compared to de Certeau's description of mystics - the particular
mystical experienc ec of an ineffable, "unsayable" union with eternity that is taken and predefined
by science and psy:'chology. Similarly, the spectre takes the perception of the "starry Heavens"
and transforms it t rough "stupendous Works" that allow the spectre to take the "Heavens" "Like
to a curtain .. .foldi ng them according to his will."
The spectree is capable of bending the perception of the "Heavens" since it is through the
vehicle of perceptiion that individuals receive their world, and if the understanding of perception
is altered , then the e perception of the world itself is altered and therefore the understanding of the
world is changed. This is the dangerous potential that Blake senses and perceives within the
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power of knowledge and in particular knowledge of control and the manipulation of knowledge.
Blake similarly distrusts a mystical experience owing to the same potential of manipulating the
interpretation and utilization of the experience to the design of control and power. Los'
comments here reflect de Certeau's description of the tendency on the part of scientific and
psychological fields of study to predefine what the mystical experience is based on the precepts
and axioms on which science and psychology are based.
When Los declares, "you talk of benevolence & virtue! I act with benevolence and
virtue," he means that the "benevolence & virtue" talked about is not the same as "benevolence
& virtue" in action. Similarly, instead of looking at what is there, at the stars themselves, the
spectre looks to what is not there in the "Voids between the Stars." In both instances, the
deceiver shifts the meaning to their own designs, their own "benevolence & virtue" or
understanding of the cosmos, whatever slant is required for the manipulation and control of
power is readily available through "Doubt & Experiment." Thus, the answer to "Doubt &
Experiment," to the malleability of knowledge and perception, is a transparent and coherent
vision that does not allow for ambiguity or potential for use in establishment of power and
control through the manipulation of how the world is understood. Moreover, the world that exists
throughout most of the plates of Jerusalem is reconciled with its fallen state in the sequence of
Albion's awakening leading up to Plate 98.
Albion is suddenly awakened:
Her voice pierc'd Albions clay cold ear. he moved upon the Rock
The Breath Divine went forth upon the morning hills, Albion mov'd
Upon the Rock, he opend his eyelids in pain; in pain he mov'd
His stony members, he saw England. Ah! shall the dead live again
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The Breath Divin es went forth over the morning hills Albion rose
In anger: the wratb of God breaking bright flaming on all sides around
His awful limbs: i to the Heavens he walked clothed in flames
Loud thundering, ith broad flashes of flaming lightning & pillars
Of fire, speaking he Words of Eternity in Human Forms, in direful
Revolutions of Action & Passion, thro the Four Elements on all sides
Surrounding his a ful Members. Thou seest the Sun in heavy clouds
Struggling to rise above the Mountains, in his burning hand
He takes his Bow .; the chooses out his arrows of flaming gold
Murmuring the B~wstring breathes with ardor! Clouds roll around the
Horns of the wid ee Bow, loud sounding winds sport on the mountain
Brows. (9:5.1-15)
Albion hears England, "Her voice," who is also called Brittannia, and slowly begins to wake up,
although it is questionable whetlner he really was asleep since Albion does participate in many
dialogues throughout Jerusalem .; although of course this could be seen as a metaphor for when
Albion intentionally turned his ack on the "Divine Vision." Albion's awakening is slow, painful
and is an intermediary step to the: full re-awakening to eternity, described metaphorically as "the
Sun in heavy clouds Struggling 0 rise above the Mountains." Furthermore, Albion seems to
prepare himself for some sort of immediate struggle to come, as he sets to getting ready a "Bow"
with "arrows of flaming gold." A lbion' s "Bow" can be interpreted as language itself, especially
if we consider a description earL ier in Jerusalem of "bars of condens'd thoughts" which are
forged "Into the sword of war: i to the bow and arrow" (9.4-5). In other words, Albion's "Bow"
is the power of knowledge and discourse, as he prepares for some conflict to come, but this
85
conflict is essentially his own fault in turning his back on divinity and causing his own fall out of
the "Heavens."
Finally, we come back to where this chapter began, Plate 98, the culmination of Albion's
awakening from what Evelyn Underhill calls the dark night of the soul before emerging into the
light of eternity. However, as stated above, even the vision of eternity found on Plate 98 is
contradicted by continual reference to the fallen world, and as Miller claims is still subject to
contraries and the possibility of duality and ambiguity. Blake's program for a visionary poem
meets with the same problem found in mystical experience in terms of the "unsayable" on the
one hand or a vision of eternity that can be communicated to all individuals on the other. For
Blake, the visionary poetic description includes the very trait it attempts to critique in the
constant and multitudinous depiction of the fallen world of repression and oppression. Bloom's
description, which attempts to consolidate Blake's vision, declares that in eternity everyone will
be engaged in peaceful yet rigorous and energetic "mental wars," though this could also be read
as Blake's own form of realism where even in the Heavens individuals struggle with each other.
In this chapter, I have discussed certain passages from Jerusalem that yield a particular
impression of Blake's perspective on the relation between knowledge, vision and the utilization
of each in the world. I postulate that for Blake visionary experience is something quite real, real
enough to influence the manipulation and control of the world in terms of certain interpretations
that lead to the institutionalization of knowledge and the consequent regulation of the individual.
Blake understood day-to-day manipulations of knowledge, which led him to try and fuse
visionary experience with a responsibility to the social repercussions of describing divinity or
eternity to the public. For this reason, Blake is not a mystic, although he is engaged in describing
the same divinity that mystics seeks to espouse, and Jerusalem is most aptly described as
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conditionally visionary, depending on which part or plate we read. In this light, Blake is in one
respect a visionary while in another a social commentator on political and religious
institutionalization and repression. Blake's vision of eternity is in a constant race to keep up with
the corruptions of the world, and in this pursuit vision sometimes falls short of its own goal of
experiencing or perceiving eternity.
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Conclusion(s)
I began this discussion by claiming that, in accord with recent trends in Blake criticism, a
certain consensus of Blake's writing is largely overdue for a critical review, particularly with
respect to whether Blake is best described as a visionary or a mystic poet. In response to previous
criticisms that label Blake as a mystic or a visionary, I maintain that he is better described as
displaying characteristics of both vision and mysticism, and that neither solely defined Blake's
writing and ideas. The predominant understanding, as established by Frye, Erdman and Bloom in
the mid-twentieth century, describes Blake's poetry and prose as achieving a perfection of
vision, described throughout the present discussion. Chapter one demonstrated the variety of
Blakean criticism and the shift in critical perspective from the mid-twentieth century to the
present. Chapter two offered multiple definitions and descriptions of mysticism and vision,
including de Certeau's significant discussion of mystics, concluding with a discussion of Blake's
own views with respect to his visionary agenda. Chapter three took up an analysis of key parts of
Jerusalem that illustrate the tension within Blake's poem between a vision of eternity and the
fallen world that constantly threatens to pollute divinity.
Blake's understanding of the relation between perception and knowledge leads him to be
cautionary in creating his visionary world. He warns the reader constantly of the power of
knowledge, particularly the power to manipulate and control through appeal to false ideas. There
is an "unsayable" aspect to Blake's ultimate visionary goal , although this is not to say that
Blake's writing is therefore meaningless. Blake's poetry and prose is an intricate "aggregate"
itself, although Blake's aggregate of characters and dialogues is designed to aid every
individual's understanding and not to hinder perception and knowledge. In the end, it is more
fitting to say that Blake is engaged in elements of mystical and visionary experience , as each
lend a mutually complementary reading of Blake's sometimes unfathomable and other times
transparently coherent writing and ideas.
88
89
[otes
The term mystics is to be distinguishe d:! from the nouns mystic and mysticism, described in detail below in chapter
woo
All references to Blake's poetry, pros ee and letters taken from David V. Erdman's The Complete Poetry and Prose
l' William Blake (Berkeley and Los An geles: University of California Press, 1982). References to Blake's visual art
aken from Morton D. Paley's William fB lake: Jerusalem (New Jersey: Princeton U P, 1991) .
This correlation between de Certeau's , mystics and McQuail's discussion is explained in detail in the next chapter.
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